"Arabi 21" obtained a message addressed to the Hamas movement by the prisoner in the prisons of the Israeli occupation, Ibrahim Hamid, in which he presents his vision of the movement's decision in the elections of the Legislative Council, and confirms that the elections will not be a solution to the Palestinian crisis.Since his arrest in 2006, Hamed has been sentenced to 54 imprisonment, on charges of leading the Izz al -Din al -Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and his responsibility for operations in which about 46 Israelis were killed.."Arabi 21" publishes a summary of the most important points included in the message, after a previous report published a major discussion in the media, and Hamas issued an official statement to respond to it..
The statement signed in the name of "the Supreme Commission for Hamas Prisoners in Zionist Prisons" denied that the prisoners have excluded from consulting regarding the decision of the elections, but he did not deny the validity of the message attributed to the detainee Ibrahim Hamid in the "Arab 21" report.
The statement said: "We (the supreme body) is an inherent part of the movement's decision and its Shura institutions, and we were extensively consistent with the decision of the elections, and we are still in the context of consulting and discussing the outputs of the dialogue sessions and the form of the".
For his part, a source familiar with Hamas confirmed to "Arabi 21" that "Hamid" sent a message to the movement regarding the elections, but he added that it had sent before the movement's decision to make its decision in the elections, although the message was dated on January 20,More than two weeks after the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, Ismail Haniyeh, announced the approval of elections without stipulating the synchronization between the legislative elections, the presidency and the National Council.
The following are the most important points mentioned in the message of the prisoner Ibrahim Hamid to lead Hamas, as part of our comprehensive coverage of the Palestinian elections to be held next May: First: The decision in the elections is a strategic and basic decision and is supposed to be done in a Shura way and to be presented to the widest possible rule asIt took place in the 2006 elections, but this was not done, and the prison sector has heard the news from the media and the statements of Gabriel Rajoub, and we do not know whether the leaders and field faces in the West Bank have consulted or not.Second: The issue of the elections is not the correct entry into to address the Palestinian situation, neither in terms of ending the division, nor in terms of confronting the deal of the century.Although the Hamas initiative to communicate with the Fatah movement in order to unify the Palestinian position against the deal of the century - according to Sheikh Saleh Al -Arouri's statements - is a high degree of importance, and it is a good entrance to water running in national and struggle life, but what happened after that isDeviation of the result of communication towards the elections, and not reaching anything common between Hamas and Fatah or at a comprehensive national level on the ground to confront the century deal.Third: The result of the elections in 2006 was practically the reason for the current division, due to the lack of acceptance of the Fatah movement with positive dealings with its results, and that the current elections will not differ from its predecessor, regardless of the results scenarios..
If the Hamas movement wins, will Fatah be handed over the outcome of the elections, or will the 2006 scenario be repeated, and if Fatah is controversial, then how will administrative and struggle will be dealt with with the occupation?Aseel in the elections, so what will prevent the occupation from arresting deputies and disrupting the Legislative Council as it happened previously? Going to the elections without answering these questions will be a reason for the complexity, not a reason for the solution.Fourth: The goal of the Fatah and Mahmoud Abbas movement from the elections is to renew the legitimacy of Abbas and weaken the legitimacy of Hamas, which it obtained in the 2006 elections, and here is another fear that is not originally the fair elections..If Abbas had held fair elections calculated for him in 2006, then the experience of local and student elections, and even within Fatah after 2006, is concerned about the possibility of no fair elections again, which will put Hamas in a great dilemma.The West Bank situation reduces the possibility of fair elections, as the West Bank is governed by "old structures, there is no enthusiasm, no popular front, no democratic, nor Islamic jihad, not even conquest, what exists is police security services (the newly developed version of Fatah) fearsPeople, and the ruling is practiced as the worst model of these authoritarian totalitarian regimes whose remains are still in the third world! "
Fifth: Hamas has not submitted any political or national demands in exchange for approval of the elections, such as asking Abbas to pressure Egypt and the occupation to lift the siege on the Gaza Strip, as well as agreeing on a program to resist the deal of the century.Sixth: It is necessary to emphasize the importance of the independence of the Hamas movement’s decision, so that its decisions do not become the result of the pressure of hostile or friendly countries, especially the countries that have a relationship with the occupation.The relationship with the countries must be based on our principles, and despite our weakness in the balance of global powers, our adherence to the right and our rejection of the waiver gives us a source of strength, for example what happened from Abbas's declaration of his rejection of the deal of the century, a position that made Trump and regional states lean and postpone a declarationThe deal in that period.Seventh: The moral position requires enthusiasm to recognize its mistakes, but the promotion of accepting the elections as a retreat from the division’s mistake appears as if the division was due to Hamas, even though the fact is that it was the result of not accepting the opening of the election result, and because of the existence of a program to bring down the Hamas government and the coup against it.Eighth: If the reconciliation requires the payment of political prices, then the price that Hamas will pay is not to reconcile with Mahmoud Abbas's political program.Hamas must have the courage to say that it does not want this reconciliation and does not want to go down to a political program that does not resemble it."We do not want a program that erases our flag and our novel.".Ninth: Hamas agreed to the elections without adhering to two basic policemans who were previously announced. The first is that the elections take place in conjunction between the Legislative Council, the Presidency and the National Council, and the second is for the authority to stop security coordination..The Cairo talks have previously stopped due to the return of the authority to security coordination, so why was this now overlooked?And that the decision of the elections should not appear without giving up security coordination, Hamas, as if it implicitly agreed to coordination?Security coordination, and other national issues.Eleven: The international, regional and internal changes were not taken into account in the decision of the elections, the most important of which is the Biden administration, its Zionist team and its program to support normalization, the growing Israeli alliance in the region, the preparations of the war on Iran, the explosion of the Arab League contract, the absence of Hamas influential in the West Bank and its deprivation of its activity by decisionFrom power.By taking these changes into consideration, did Hamas think about how to deal with the situation if it lost its legitimacy in the elections, and asked her, for example, to disarm them? Twelfth: The Cairo Agreement talks about the PLO elections after the legislative and presidential elections.Was a discussion inside Hamas or at the national level about the nature of the organization that we want?
"What about non -patriotic policies, decisions and deviant confessions since 1974? Do we have a legal apparatus to reconsider and propose what we see that meets our vision and vision of large groups and segments of our people?
What about the relations of the International Liberation Organization, and the restrictions governed by it, what do we need for all this burden? Do we want to judge or want to liberate: Where is the central task? What are the appropriate organizational formulas for these matters?! What are our jurisprudence and approaches and our endeavors to establish a national culture and addresses that can be called and the gathering of others around it? Where is our endeavor and our role in developing a new Palestinian consensus? If the upcoming Palestinian National Council will represent (13) million Palestinians, what is the inclusive program that meets the needs and aspirations of each group? What about the "Liberation of Palestine" program, can it be re -considered, or the reaction to it in the programs of the wandering and the loss that sought and seeks to topple it, and is there another program that is able to reflect and translate the aspirations and aspirations of all the thirty million people of our people? Is our world, mental and intellectual revolves around these issues, or is it empty? Do we have our own doctrine in liberation, which exceeds the rhetoric? Do we really want to liberate Palestine, when we write this slogan and raise it in our documents and data, do we mean what we say? Do we build our policies, communications, approaches, diplomacy, and resistance on this basis and take this consideration?!.