If we still believe that Arab national security is one, Egyptian, Saudi, Iraqi, Maghreb, or otherwise (from the ocean to the Gulf), then the question that I am afraid of has been absent from everyone is: that is, a "legal" situation for the two islands, is the best for considerations of thisNational Security?Noting that I am talking here about the "Arab" national security, not only the Egyptian
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The court ruled (January 16, 2017) - AFP ©
The shocking news (or the paradox, if you wish) that on the fifty anniversary of the defeat of the fifth of June, in which more than eleven thousand Egyptians paid their lives in defense of the "land", which coincides with the covenant of this year with the anniversary of the tenth of Ramadan, in which he paid thousands Other Egyptians are their lives on the path of recovering the "land", the decision -maker did not hesitate to push the Egyptian parliament to discuss the "Tiran and Sanafir" agreement despite a final and final judgment that makes it like non -existence, and despite an explicit constitutional text that prohibits the abdication of the "land" under any circumstance From the circumstances. Despite what all this means politically from the wasting of the parliament for a judicial ruling, which is beating the killing of the legitimacy of the existing regime constitutionally on the separation of powers and the elevation of the law.
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Initially, I return to repeat what I explained a hundred times in what I wrote on the topic, from emphasizing that I am not discussing the legal arguments for this or that (the court settled the issue in the merits of 58 pages).It remains important for every "Arab";Egyptian or Saudi;No difference, the answer to the question that I put at the head of this article: Any "legal" situation for the two islands, will be the best for Arab national security considerations (not only the Egyptian)?Hence, who is in his interest to waste the considerations of the "Arab" national security so that?And for the benefit of (?!)
Moreover, I am back to mention that the Egyptian -Saudi relations (popularly) were not affected in their history, just as it was unfortunately affected by what was young of this agreement.Or rather, what he saw his management style and the contexts of announcing it.It is interested in monitoring what happened (popularly) to return to the "chauvinist" staples that exceeded every limit that would leave a scars that will not unfortunately recite a long time ago.Despite the fact that "Arab" national security is one.And that the interest, by virtue of history, religion and language is one.Despite the fact that the issue is in fact, as it will be clear in the coming lines is not "Egyptian / Saudi", but "Arab / Israeli"
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The Gulf of Aqaba (96 miles) is separated between the eastern coast of the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula and the western coast of a part of the north of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At the entrance (the narrow) of the strait, the two islands are located "Tiran and Sanafir". The island of Tiran is three miles away from the Egyptian coast, and from the Saudi coast four and a half miles. The two islands are made naturally three corridors to and from the Gulf, the first of which is between the Coast of the Sinai and the island of Tiran, and it is the only good for navigation (a depth of 290 meters), whose name is a navigator "Enterprise" corridor. The second is also between the Coast of the Sinai and the island of Tiran, and its name is "Grafton", and its depth does not exceed (73 meters), while the third is between the two islands "Tiran and Sanafir". It is only 16 meters deep, and the importance of the two (unprecedented) islands lies in their strategic location on the "gate" of the Gulf of Aqaba. This makes the controller in the Strait of Tiran realistically in the entry and exit movement to the Gulf, which represents the only outlet to the Umm al -Rashrash region occupied by the Israeli forces in March 1949 to become an Israeli port (Eilat).
The conclusion is that the strategic location of the strait has always made it an important number in the national security equations of Egypt, and it reached the point that it was a direct reason for the outbreak of the 1967 war.
In the diaries of the strait related to national security (which is many) a leaflet bearing No. 39 of 1950 issued by the Egyptian Ports and Burns Authority on December 21, 1950 (after the 1948 war, and at the request of the Ministry of War), and was distributed to all foreign missions. In its first item, it is stipulated that warn up to any Israeli warship or affiliated with Israel trying to pass in territorial waters, including the Tiran Strait. It also stipulates in his third item to the Egyptian authorities' exercise of the "war" to ensure the identity, destination and nature of the goods loaded on foreign "neutral" ships crossing the strait. "So that the use of this right does not hinder the freedom of traffic (innocent), as the stable rules are eliminated in similar situations."
Practicing this right, we read in the straits of the strait that the Egyptian authorities arrested the American ship in November 1953, and did not allow it to pass until after making sure that it carries shipments from wheat to the Jordanian port of Aqaba.While it did not allow the Italian ship Maria Antonia to cross after it turned out that it carries materials of a strategic nature on its way to the Israeli port.
The strait diary also tells how the Great Britain government complained about these measures.This was a place of great controversy that ended with the British recognition of the legitimacy of Egyptian procedures regarding the exercise of its sovereignty on the Strait of Tiran.(Please return to the memo of the British ambassador in Cairo, sent to the Egyptian Foreign Minister on July 29, 1951, following the crisis of the English ship Empire Roach, which was held by the Egyptian authorities after its captain refused to comply with the orders).
Also in the diaries of the strait, or in its significance, Egypt was not keen on the armistice agreement (after the 1956 war) of Egyptian sovereignty over the strait, as it is within the Egyptian region (by virtue of its sovereignty over the two islands), but the Egyptian keenness later not to affect the terms of the Egyptian peace treatyIsraeli (1979), whose fifth article provides for "freedom of navigation and air transit" with the legal status of the strait and water, which Egyptian diplomacy was keen to confirm when ratifying the United Nations Agreement on the Law of the Law in July 1983.
It is known to those with specialization that this international seas law, which was included in the 1982 agreement, gives the beach states authority over their regional sea, which is represented by several things, including the following:
The right to take the necessary measures to prevent non -innocent traffic.
The right to stop the "innocent" traffic from certain areas of the regional sea, "if this suspension is necessary to protect the coastal state security."
The right to request the departure of warships to the regional sea in the event that they do not comply with the coastal state systems.
This is what Egyptian diplomats and military personnel know that Egypt has repeatedly practiced (by virtue of its sovereignty over the islands of Tiran and Sanafir) in defense of its economic and security interests.
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The bottom line, then we can read it clear in the facts of geography, history, and international law, as well as national security:
1- In the facts of geography: The Strait of Tiran (which separates the island of Tiran and the Sinai coast) is the only outlet for the Gulf of Aqaba as the only corridor for navigation.
2- In the facts of international law: If the island remains the same as "Egyptian", this corridor remains an Egyptian internal water. And Egypt remains all the rights of sovereignty over the corridor. Although the peace agreement with Israel and the rules of international law imposes freedom of "innocent" traffic on the strait. (I repeat: “The innocent”), this principle is disrupted during the war, so that Egypt becomes the absolute right to impose the rules it wants to pass (or prevent traffic) in the strait. In the event that the two islands become Saudi (regardless of the reasons), the corridor becomes automatically a "international" path by definition, Egypt (nor Saudi Arabia) does not have any authority over it, neither in the time of peace, nor in wartime.
3- In the facts of history: that actually happened once, and Egypt stopped Western ships carrying weapons and strategic materials to Israel in the fifties of the last century.
4- In the facts of national security: controlling the marine corridors that secure commercial and "military" paths is one of the most important factors that enhance the national security of any country.Therefore, for example, we understand why Britain still adheres to the islands of Gibraltar in front of the Spanish coast.And why did it fought its latest wars in the modern era (April 1982) to regain its control over the Falklands corresponding to Argentina, although it is thousands of miles away from British lands.
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On the sidelines of the whole issue, I do not know whether someone who is noticed (or means to be aware) that the acknowledgment of the non -dependence of the two islands to Egypt, Abdel Nasser’s decision to close the Gulf of Aqaba (the Strait of Tiran), is lost as “Egyptian water” in front of Israeli navigation (May 22, 1967)Its legitimacy, and makes the Israelis the right to sue Egypt and its demand for compensation.
I do not know if someone is noticed (or it means to pay attention) to that.But I do not imagine that between the Egyptians or between the Saudis, who wants it?
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And yet ..
To what extent does the decision regarding the two islands relate to new regional arrangements, there are those who want to open the way for it, achieving a strategic gain that he did not succeed in obtaining the war for decades of conflict?
Or rather, to what extent related to the issue of the two islands "the deal of the century" that Trump promised, and the president referred to it in his presence, and the Israelis spoke about it clearly more than once?I cannot cut the answer, in which he may argue with me (despite its clarity like the sun) or that of those who are satisfied with looking under their feet.But like any "Arab" is keen on the "Arab" national security and not only the Egyptian, I am not able, and evidence is a significance other than that I feel anxiety.And more accurately on the "Arab" script with question marks.
May God have mercy on Abdel Nasser (and his companions) who knew the strategic value of the "land", and the importance of being "Egyptian";Not only for Egyptian national security, but for the "Arab" national security.
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It remains that what was stated in the lines is high, was the subject of more than one dialogue between me and a number of Saudi intellectuals (friends), and those who have the right to me to note here that their agreement with the above does not express only intellectual sophistication, and an "true" Arab affiliation with themAbove the polarization and foolishness of his narrow look.
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Related Links:
On the two islands "and the strait" .. notes and questions
The talk of Abdel Nasser on the Egyptian and the two islands and the strait
Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution
The documents of the two islands submitted to the State Council
The final ruling of the court and the Egyptians in the Egyptians of the two islands
Is it really the "last wars"?