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Jun 25By smartai.info

Turkey and the Middle East

The Middle East has the utmost effects on the balance of international powers, considering an important mechanism of control of the international system due to its strategic importance in civilized, geographically, economically and politically..

The Middle East region did not want the aspirations of Turkish leaders who preceded the leaders of the Custice and Development Party to the rule of Turkey.This was expressed by Tansu Chiller, the former Prime Minister of Turkey in 1994, saying: “The Middle East region is living in the stage of the establishment of a new regional system, and Turkey must have an important role in drawing its features. The peace process is based on building economic cooperation and here Turkey plays its pivotal role,As it represents a link between East and West »([1]).

International changes, especially after the events of september 11, 2001, are among the factors that prompted Turkey to follow more policies in the region. وقد باشرت مشروعاً طموحاً للتغير، لكنها حتى الآن لم تصل إلى إنتهاج سياسة خارجية “مستقلة” عن تحالفاتها “الغامضة” و”المُربَكة” مع الغرب([2])

There is no doubt that Turkey's endeavor to the regional role and status was, and still is a fixed aspiration, but it was floating or flooding according to the conditions of the Cold War and Turkey's membership in NATO, as well as the regional situation.When the circumstances changed, Turkey opened new doors to formulate a regional trend, highlighted by a major force in its spheres of influence and an influential element in the Middle East and around the Middle East ([3]).

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And because Turkey cannot go into the implementation of its project towards the Middle East for objective reasons (its limited capabilities) and environmental (the nature of the relations that exist between the units of this region and its problems) and international (this region is greatly subject to projects of major international units such as the United states of America, the European Union, Russia and IndiaChina and influential as Israel), so Turkey resorted to the style of partnerships and alliances with other forces to achieve its higher interests.

3 - 1 - Middle East: concept, population composition and geographical borders:

It is necessary when studying political phenomena, especially with regard to international relations, issues and problems, determining the time period and geographical area (international units targeted in study) for these phenomena, issues or problems, and what we need in the topic of our research when mentioning the term Middle East - the field of study - is to determine the geographical area Which is included in this term (i.e. the international units that fall within it) with a reference to the human composition (ethnic, ideological and cultural) in which it lives, because the human factor (and what is related to it) in this region is one of the strongest influences that define its political conditions and social and security stability.

The term Middle East is like most of the terms of political science is difficult to define its meaning and dimensions in an agreed manner.

وتعد منطقة الشرق الأوسط واحدة من أهم المناطق المؤثرة في توازن القوى والمصالح في العالم، فموقعها الإستراتيجي الفريد جعلها محكومة بقانون التداخل والتعارض بين الأضداد، كما أن توسط موقعها بين قارات العالم القديم أوربا وآسيا وأفريقيا، وتماسكها جغرافياً وتحكمها بأهم الممرات الدولية مثل قناة السويس ومضيق باب المندب ومضيق هرمز، ومضيق جبل طارق والبسفور والدردنيل وإحتضانها حوض البحر الأحمر وإشرافها على جنوب وشرق البحر المتوسط والبحر العربي وإطلالها على المحيط الأطلنطي والمحيط الهندي قد جعل منها منطقة ذات أهمية قصوى في العلاقات الدولية وتأثير كبير في تضارب المصالح العالمية([4]).

تُعد المنطقة العربية والشرق الأوسط إمتداداً واحداً لإقليم حضاري متميز، ويشغل هذا الإقليم مساحة تزيد عن ستة عشر مليون كيلو متر مربع، ويمتد لمسافة تزيد عن ثمانية آلاف وستة آلاف كيلو متر من الشرق الى الغرب ومن الشمال الى الجنوب على التوالي، ويمتد على مدى خمسة وثمانين درجة طول واربعة واربعين دائرة عرضية، والإصطلاح المكاني للمنطقة العربية والشرق أوسطية يدخلان بدورهما في إطار الإمتداد الجغرافي للعالم الإسلامي([5]) .

There has been no clear and clear historical source in which the origin of this term or the time in which it exactly appeared or who launched this term to name this geographical area.

إذا كانت البدايات الأولى لمفهوم وموروث الشرق الأوسط قد جائت عن طريق البرتغاليين فإن ذيوع هذا المصطلح وهذا المفهوم قد جاء من نتاح الفكر الغربي الإستعماري وبعده بعدة قرون حينما أُرتبط ذيوعه بتطور الفكر الإستراتيجي الإنجليزي، وثم إستخدام مصطلح الشرق الأوسط لأول مرة عام 1902 بواسطة الكاتب الأمريكي المتخصص في الإستراتيجية البحرية ” الفريد ماهان ” لدى مناقشة الإستراتيجية البحرية الإمبريالية البريطانية، وذلك للإشارة في المسالك الغربية والشمالية المؤدية الى الهند ([6]) .

أما الأمم المتحدة فإنها وضعت قائمة تشمل الدول الأعضاء التي تكون الشرق الأوسط(*) وكان ذلك بمناسبة الإقتراح الذي تقدم به مندوب لبنان بالمنظمة الدولية عام 1948، لإنشاء لجنة إقتصادية للشرق الأوسط. وإنتهت اللجنة الخاصة التي تشكلت لهذا الغرض، الى وضع قائمة تضم: أفغانستان، إيران، سوريا، لبنان، تركيا، السعودية، اليمن، مصر، أثيوبيا واليونان([7]).

يتضح لنا مما سبق، إن هذا المفهوم يتسع ويضيق – جغرافياً – حسب الطروحات الفكرية (سياسية، إقتصادية) التي تُقدم لتطبيقها على هذه المنطقة على شكل مشاريع، مثلاً مشروع سوق شرق أوسطية مشتركة، ومشروع الشرق الأوسط الكبير – الذي تطور الى مشروع الشرق الأوسط الموسع –، ومشروع الشرق الأوسط الجديد، وغيرها([8]) .

The Middle East is a region where multiple entities or geographical blocs overlap.... and it is characterized by multiple and ethnic, religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity that made the most general of Western writers collect what they consider a soils nature of the region:

A- Most of the people of the region belong to the ethnic aspects of the following sub -strains: “The semites, the Turks, the Indians, and the Aryan”..As for the Turks, they spread across the northern belt, and they form most of the population of modern Turkey.In addition, there are many other ethnic groups such as the Kurds (who are mainly in Turkey, northern Iraq, Iran, etc.).

The Middle East is the cradle of the three monotheistic monotheistic religions (Islamic, Christian and Cudaism), but the followers of these religions are divided into many sects and sects as well as limited and scattered religions and beliefs.

B - From a linguistic point of view, Arabic, Persian and Turkish languages prevail in their many local dialects, in addition to other limited languages such as Hebrew, Aramaic, syriac ... etc..

ولا شك أن الدين والثقافة من الأمور الحاسمة في تحديد التنوع الداخلي الذي تقسم به المنطقة والهوية المميزة لها على السواء([9]).

On the basis of this identification, the (Middle East) is one of the most important civilizational, economic, strategic and political areas in the world since ancient times.... and all the heavenly religions appeared here - in the heart of the Middle East and spread from it.... ولا يزال يشكل عاملاً غير مرئي من بين أهم عوامل الصراع الدولي المعاصر([10]).

The opinions and variety of researchers and studies centers inside and outside the region on the identification of countries that enter the Middle East and what they come out of it have been. غير أنه يمكن أن نميز بين دول تكاد تتفق حولها كافة الإجتهادات والآراء – والتي يجمع عليها الباحثون ومراكز الدراسات – تشكل بالتالي “قلب” المنطقة (*) وهي: العراق وسوريا ولبنان والأردن وفلسطين ومصر، ويطلق عليها المجال الحيوي للشرق الأوسط.

Outside this framework, a distinction between the countries surrounding the heart can be distinguished by saudi Arabia, Libya, Iran, Turkey and sudan.Then marginal states, opinions differ severely about their integration within the Middle East region and include: First: the rest of the group of North African countries - that is, the countries of the Arab Maghreb and include Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.

second: Another African extension towards the south, which includes: Ethiopia and somalia.

Third: The rest of the peninsula countries include: Yemen, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates and the sultanate of Oman.

Fourth: A European Middle East extension is: Cyprus and Greece.

خامساً: إمتداد آسيوي شرقاً يشمل: باكستان وأفغانستان والجمهوريات الإسلامية في أسيا الوسطى والقوقاز التي إستقلت بعد إنهيار الإتحاد السوفيتي القديم وهي كازخستان وأوزبكستان وتركمانستان، وقيرغيزستان وأذربيجان([11]) .

وعندما نتحدث عن الشرق الأوسط نعني بذلك “دول القلب” والدول المحيطة بها، أي المنطقة الممتدة التي تشمل إيران والعراق وسوريا ولبنان وتركيا والأردن وفلسطين وإسرائيل والسعودية ومصر ولبنان والسودان(*).

It was held in Madrid on 10/30/1991 a conference in which the “Regional system for the Middle East region” was presented and was briefly called “Middle East system”, in which Turkey found a way for the issues that this system will derive to address, such as water issues, security arrangements, and limitFrom arms, economic development, and refugee affairs. وجميعها موضوعات تشكل جدول أعمال لجان التفاوض متعددة الأطراف، المنبثقة عن المؤتمر([12]).

و ثمة إختلافات كبيرة بين الباحثين في تحديد موقع تركيا من النظام الإقليمي في الشرق الأوسط, فوصفها “بايندر” ضمن خارج دول القلب, بينما وصفها كل من “بريتشر” و “كانتوري” و “شبيجل” ضمن دول الهامش, و وصفها “تومسن” و “هدسون” ضمن دول القلب, وتشير إحدى الدراسات الغربية إلى أن موقع تركيا من النظام الإقليمي في الشرق الأوسط يتحدد على ضوء طبيعة هذا النظام وحدوده([13]).

The Turkish government realizes that the United states of America and Israel in particular need Turkey to implement its Middle East project in three areas: - The security field.Political field.Economic field ([14]).

Thus, Turkey has become a strategic orientation towards the Middle East, which includes three areas:

The Middle East represents a wide -spectrum link between Turkey and the United states, from security and strategy to controlling conflicts, encouraging political settlements, containing “terrorism” ... etc., and this work is greatly complicated, and therefore it requires a political “compulsory” and “compromising”“Between them.....But he cannot play a decisive role in solving problems, perhaps because things are more complicated, and require greater material and moral capabilities and resources than Turkey ([15]).

3- 2Political field:

The vital interests of the United states of America as well as securing the situation of Israel (as a country) among the Arab countries, which led it to present the idea of the Middle East project, and adopted its implementation in this region.(From this work, you are trying to find a "world that seeks to establish it and not a world based on it," according to Henry Kissinger, the Us secretary of state in the administration of President Richard Nixon) ([16])..

In his article (Towards an American -European strategy for the Middle East), stephen Calvin says: “The European -American -American strategy also needs the Middle East to Turkey as well.In this regard, American -European efforts must be made to consider Turkey as a strategic partner ([17]).

It is possible to mark the contents of the main Middle East project, which is providing support for regional arrangements as a political basis, security, and improving economic conditions in line with American interests, enhances its position and directs the region towards it..The main goal of it is to contain the Arab world politically, economically, militarily and culturally, to adapt its political movement and adapt it according to what American interests require and its development to serve the strategic goals of the United states at the regional and international levels ([18]).

Turkey plays the role of regional and international balance in a vehicle, and it must be emphasized that some of this role is natural, or other policies require, and it is not in any case intentionally or planned for it.The overlap between the objective dimensions and the intentional dimensions must be observed, and between what the Turks want for themselves and what they want for others, or what others want from them. وهنا قد تؤدي تركيا دور الموازن كجزء من سياسات المكانة، وسياسات الأمن القومي والتحالف الإقليمي وإحتواء مصادر التهديد وتعظيم المكاسب من الأطراف المتصارعة...etc.([19]).

"Turkey was not active in foreign affairs, and did not start initiatives at the bilateral or multilateral level, but rather is directed by an obsession with the defensive belief" ([20])..so Turkey must draw its self -path if it really seeks to ward off new dangers about itself or exploit new opportunities ([21]).

Turkish policy makers need to devise an integrated response to such threats and opportunities take into account the need for changes in domestic politics as well as complex foreign policy options.Complex foreign policy options require the establishment of a balance between the least effective neutrality in Turkey's relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and the inherent temptation to be involved in an effective endeavor to dominate the region ([22]).

3- 1- 1- Motivates:

Turkey has many motives that it urges to strive to achieve its goals and objectives in the Middle East project, as it sees that the Middle East region and all its problems and problems are an arena that represents its supreme interests.With more accurate and brief legs, the reasons for Turkey's rush in its strategic orientation towards the Middle East are:

Certainly, Turkey wants to play a major role in the Middle East, through a strong, modern country, through four main axes, which have become internal and external options, which are united by the overwhelming majority of elites, leaders and political parties, namely: 1- Urban, 2- Democracy (and marginalizationThe role of the military establishment), 3- moderate Islam, 4- Al -Turanah ([23]).

If the “perfection” in the past is the most defense and enthusiastic about strong relations with the West, and the integration of the European Union, then the Islamic “Custice and Development” are the ones who play this role today.Turkey today, led by the Custice and Development Party, is based on its external relations, not only from the principle of strengthening relations with the depth of the country's regional strategic country, but also an attempt to liquidate historical problematic deposits with the neighborhood([24]).

Turkey has rushed and rushed to work this project, due to its desire to enhance its regional role, by taking advantage of its strengths, especially in the field of water on the one hand, and its growing relations with the United states and Israel on the other hand, as wellThe regional system, which benefits it in getting out of its economic problems ([25]).

Turkey, for its part, is trying to occupy a distinguished location in the ongoing regional arrangements in the region, based on the following entrances: its geographical -political location, water wealth, and its military power.Turkey also aspires to be the “Middle East food basket” based on its water projects, the most important of which is the “GAP” project on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers.In addition to all this, Turkey is trying to market its status as a democratic - secular state in the region, and it is on this basis - it can be a bridge between the Western world and the Islamic world ([26]).

European rejection of joining the Union led to isolating Turkey and forcing it to go to Washington more.As for the United states of America, which was determined to create a system that allows it to play a dominant role on Europe and the Middle East, it has strengthened its relations with Ankara, but at the expense of Ankara ([27]).

This is what led (Turkey) to play with the eastern option paper in favor of the Western option, because the Turkish trend towards the Middle East and Central Asia (Economic Cooperation Organization) is not only aimed at linking these regions to the alleged Turkish world, as much as it is to support the Turkish negotiating position with the European groupWhich still refuses Turkey to enter it because of its eastern affiliation, and despite that, Ankara insists on “the connection to the East is only a tactical goal to join the West with strong negotiation logic and Turkish conditions” ([28]).

The acceleration of the steps on the path of the European Union is closely linked to a new Turkish strategy and bets that find the only hope for establishing a healthy and free society of structural problems.In economic progress, in real justice and freedom, and in the exit from a "second world" to a "first scientist" that Turkey's accession to the European Union, and its establishment at the same time, is balanced and good relations with its surroundings without polarization here and there, will give Turkey the opportunity to transform not to a regional stateMission only, but to a major country at the global level.This allows her to play an active and influential role in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus, by virtue of its religious and ethnic extensions.such Turkey is a difficult number in the European equation and turns it into a multi -dimensional country within the union, and Turkey can turn into a global state ([29]).

Likewise, Turkey pushed to ally strongly with a force from within the Middle East region with close connections to the European Union and the United states of America, which is Israel.To achieve a rapprochement with the European Union.And benefit from the Israeli lobby in the United states and the European Union.

The friendly relations with Israel also provide Turkey with a weight against the Cewish lobby in America, which can be used against Greece ([30]).Turkey aims to deal with Israel to satisfy the Turkish Cewish businessmen, whose influence has expanded and began to form a political lobby at home.....As for Washington, Turkish -Israeli cooperation occupies an important position on the American strategic map in the Middle East ([31]).

Turkish relations with (Israel) are an integral part of Turkish foreign policy, as Turkey is an integral part of the Western -American strategy - ([32]).

The Israel and the United states of America form - in the eyes of Turkey - the basic force that drives the development towards the “Middle East”. The new role that Turkey seeks to perform in the framework of the Middle Eastern organization is a development of its main pivotal role within the framework of the changing strategy of the United states, which helps Turkey to"Regional positioning" and determining its role to obtain the utmost benefits, and to be at the same time, a balance of a balance in the desired organization ([33]).

The "strategic Vision Document" signed between Turkey and the United states of America in (Culy 2006) is very vital, which Recep Tayyip Erdogan described by saying that: "We will secure us the framework necessary to develop the Turkish -American -American partnership..We appreciate our relationship with the United states of America.This relationship arises, formulating a common vision and unified and long -term interests. وتتشارك تركيا والولايات المتحدة الأميركية المُثُل نفسها في مجال تطبيق أهدافهما على الصعيدين الإقليمي والعالمي... نحن نشهد اليوم حالة فريدة، حيث يجب علينا تنويع وسائل معالجة التحديات المشتركة، كما يجب تعزيز أحدنا للآخر في عدد كبير من المجالات، ما يتيح لنا فرص النجاح من خلال حوار متين وتشاور مثمر([34]) .

saif Tashhan says: Our joining the European Union is necessary to the farthest extent for the sake of Turkish economy and democracy and for the permanence of political and social structure.Our entry into the European Union does not necessarily lead to abandoning other methods.There is nothing called the choice of Turkey, as there is a multi -directional policy in Turkey, this policy will continue, and the European Union is a trend that Turkey cannot be abandoned ([35]).

There are close political ties between Turkey and Europe, perhaps the most prominent of which is the Union Agreement, including the customs unit with the European Union, followed by NATO membership, and the membership of the fellowship in the Western European Union (WE U), Turkey also enjoys the membership of the European Council, and the security and Cooperation Organization in Europe (O s C E), And other European organizations and institutions of political importance, including similar political parties, business ties and unions in which they enjoy the status of associations in European union ([36]).

وكذلك، ثمة في الواقع التزامات متبادلة بين تركيا والإتحاد الأوروبي حول الحد من الهجرة السرّية، إحتواء العنف الإقليمي ” الإرهاب”، الجماعات الراديكالية، تهريب المخدرات، الجريمة المنظّمة والنزعات السياسية للجاليات التركية والإسلامية في أوروبا...etc..Turkey depends on "acceptance" and "understanding" a European "understanding" of its policy in the Middle East, due to two main factors:

Turkey's ability to deal with the region, it is “part of it”, and it has an active susceptibility to influence it, especially after the government of the Custice and Development Party takes over..

Europe’s desire to focus its efforts on European issues, topics of integration, and the containment of economic and financial crises, and the union’s desire to alleviate its direct involvement in regional policies ([37]).Turkey's desire to establish stronger and better relations with the West, and the establishment of peace talks and agreements between a number of Arab countries and (Israel), undoubtedly facilitated the establishment of Turkish (Israeli) relations, depending on that these relations may change the Western view towards Turkey, which is an Islamic state,This may allow her to depend on the Zionist lobby and on (Israel) to overcome the obstacles that may arise in front of it in Western forums.In addition, such relations may enable them to pressure syria, Iraq and Iran ([38]).

Turkey's rush to support American policies and to play an active role in the framework of its special strategy in the region, will take more and more city, which means entering relations between Turkey and the United states of America as another more close and harmony, at least in relation to the Middle East region.And we do not find what calls for the belief or perception of the possibilities of the United states of America abandoning what it considers "its interests and responsibility" in the Middle East and its strategy to achieve these interests, and then sacrifice its relations with a reliable and well -recipient ally in accordance with its immediate and future strategy considerations, not only in the Middle East.Rather, those related to Central Asia, Caucasus, and Federal Russia ([39]).

Ahmed Davutoglu says: What the sister peoples in the Middle East should understand, that our interest in all this geography and all these regions does not mean that Turkey wants to create a new Ottoman country or that it works as part of a project that works for the benefit of another country such as the United states of America or Europe orRussia ([40]).

The geographical -political location was important to Turkey was a cause for the greatest powers to contain it, as was the reason for pushing it to adopt a foreign policy based on cooperation and alliance with the West in general and the United states of America in particular.....And because Turkey described it as an important geographical -political aspect, this is due to the great importance that the United states attaches to this environment, the Middle East region, including the Arabian Gulf in particular, as a vital interest of American national security and then for the political -security function that can be establishedIt has Turkey within the framework of the American strategy of the region, to serve the American interests (the Gulf oil and its investment projects there ([41]).

One of the reasons for the Turkish entry on the crisis line in the region is to send messages that:

1- That attendance and the growing Turkish strategic role in the Middle East will benefit from Europe, if it agreed to include Turkey in its club.

2- Turkey seeks to recover its position and role in the Arab and Islamic worlds. If Europe blocked its doors in the face of its accession to the European Union.

In order for Turkey not to remain “deprived of entering the mosque and the church”, as described by the Kurdish proverb, it went to invest problems and crises in the region, and to refuse to employ its Islamic and Middle Eastern backgrounds, after she spent more than half a century trying to join the European club ([42]).

It may be the right time for Turkey to use its fame as the most advanced Islamic country to enhance its international position, and it plays a role as a progressive democratic power.All of this would be in the long run to facilitate the acceptance of the West to the Islamic world ([43]).so she invested this matter to present itself as a model for the rest of the Islamic countries and peoples.

Turkey has a relationship with Iran as well. Official relations cover the fact of strategic competition that has existed for a long time, which is increased by ideological differences.In the current circumstances, the Ottomans' hostility with the safavids declined to replace the dispute between the secular republic of Turkey and the Islamic revolution.....Although both parties provide the safe shelter for opposition groups to the other country, this conflict is waged by the two parties with more activity along both sides of their common borders, in Azerbaijan and in Iraq([44]).

And Turkey is trying justice and development to employ its good relations with the anti -United states forces such as Iran, Hamas, syria, and even relations with Hezbollah, in order to play certain roles that other countries cannot play..Turkey always seeks to persuade Washington to solve problems with dialogue.However, Turkey's communication with these forces did not lead to practical results due to the intransigence of the neo -conservatives and Israel and insisting on the policy of destructive chaos and violence to subject the forces opposing their policies in preparation for the division of the region and the transmission of sectarian strife.The difference between the policies of the Custice and Development Government on the policies of its predecessors, that it no longer stands as a spectator, but rather takes the initiative as a notice to others of its existence and its ability ([45]).

The Turks are planning foreign policies driven by a strong desire to complete the ingredients.Here, the Turks talk about that their state can play this role in the regional system (and the international) and see that it has been prepared for that through its availability on a supposed group of factors such as: the geographical location between East and West, the experience of modernization, political will, soft power, following an external policyActivist ([46]).

That Turkey received acceptance and welcome from the Arab and regional circles because it stood alongside Arab issues such as the war on Gaza in 2008, in which Turkey stood a more positive stance than the Arab countries that were unable to establish an emergency summit until after a long period ([47]).

The goals of Turkey, which it aims to achieve behind the revitalization of its regional role is ([48]):

Turkey is seriously seeking to occupy an advanced position in the Middle East that had been missing about a century ago, and it takes into account the American influence in the region.....Turkey is certain that America will not be able in the future to continue with the region’s decision.Therefore, she headed to adopt her own strategy in the region in which there is no total organism with the United states of America, and there is also no confrontation or hostility to America even in the context of its relations with Israel ([49]).

2- 2- ingredients:

Turkey was advancing on the path of political reform.In order for a profit, it was necessary to follow an influential, dynamic and multi -dimensional foreign policy, establishing a central position for Turkey in the international arena.Turkey had three obstacles: terrorism, political instability, and economic crises.Dawood Aglu believes that Turkey has succeeded in absorbing and overcoming these obstacles, in following a flexible foreign policy ([50]).Turkey and the capabilities, factors and resources it possesses (the researcher had previously dealt with in the second chapter) that made many countries in the region and even the major countries that they explicitly asked them to be a partner in achieving their goals and goals for their need for Turkey.

The United states of America needs the Turkish role as a participating party in the process of controlling the movement of other regional powers (regional balance).....According to this strategic relationship between them, Washington pushed to involve Ankara an important role in its proposed Middle East project, a project that aims from other purposes to break the regional system and end it and create a new regional system, and links (Israel) a closer link to it, and to rely on two basic pillars: (IsraelFirst and then Turkey second ([51]).

The current strategy of NATO encourages more tasks to engage in the Middle East, because this would achieve direct and wide gains for European security needs ([52]).In this context, the extent that the Turkish -Israeli military agreement was an important step that Israel has made in the direction of imposing its concept for the Middle East regime project in the region, as it embodied Turkey's desire to enhance its impact on the scope of this project and strengthen its European ambitions ([53]).

ففي 12 من أيلول 1996، أشار المتحدث الرسمي بإسم الخارجية الأميركية في معرض تعليقه على سياسة بلاده تجاه العراق، إلى أن الإدارة الأميركية” تحدثت فيما مضى عن مصالحها في المنطقة وإن النفط وإستمرار تدفقه إلى الولايات المتحدة هو بالتأكيد جزء هام منها....The other part of our policy is protection and standing by our allies. We have important allies and friends in the region, including Turkey and (Israel) and both of them...We can invite them..With the bilateral pillar of our policy directed to maintain the maximum degree of stability ([54]).

What helps to stimulate the Turkish role in the region and regionally, what was characterized by its relations with the United states of America, as it is relations of an alliance nature through Turkey's involvement in NATO (NATO) ([55]).

Turkey, then, facing a new strategy, enjoys internal, political and military consensus, and the success of Turkey in walking between the tremendous contradictions in its surroundings and in the world, especially on the eve and after the occupation of Iraq, an indication of the correctness and depth of this strategy that establishes a global role for Turkey by establishing friendship with everyone and not acrossMilitary force that does not improve America and Israel except ([56]).

The neutral Turkey will play an effective role in the Middle East, a role that has not played in the past because of its Western connections ([57]).

Turkey has sought and planned to employ economic and political inputs towards the neighboring countries (the Arab East), which provides an opportunity to perform an important job in leading policies in the new regional system in the Middle East ([58]).

Ahmed Davutoglu believes that the solution lies in the adoption of a “new Ottoman”, and the new Ottoman does not mean the resurrection of the expansionist policies of the Ottoman Empire, nor to return to the formal past, but rather three pillars, the first of which is that Turkey reconcile with itself Islamic civilization in peace, and proud of its “Ottoman” past.Multi -cultures and ethnicity, expansion of freedoms at home, and protect security abroad, and the second: he recovered the sense of greatness, Ottoman pride and self -confidence when acting in foreign policy, and the third: continuing to open up to the West, with the establishment of balanced relations with the Islamic East ([59]).Turkey, through this idea, wants to be a focused country in the region.

وتركيب تركيا الإقليمي المتعدد – هويات إقليمية متعددة – يمنحها القدرة على المناورة في العديد من المناطق، ومن ثم فهي تتحكم في منطقة نفوذ في جوارها المباشر... ستكون إلتزامات تركيا من التشيلي الى إندونيسيا، ومن أفريقيا الى آسيا الوسطى ومن الإتحاد الأوروبي الى منظمة المؤتمر الإسلامي جزءاً من مقاربة شاملة للسياسة الخارجية، وستجعل المبادراتُ تركيا فاعلاً عالمياً كما يقول أحمد داوود أوغلو (وزير خارجية تركيا) ([60]).

The government of the party with an Islamic background has adopted a civilized project, aiming to modernize the Turkish experience, liberate it from its extremist secularism, and work to reconcile it with its Islamic past and bring it closer to its western future, without neglecting its Arab and Islamic civilized depth that extends in the Middle East, Central Asia and Africa, which is an alternativeAn important strategic strategy that supports the center of Turkey in its relations at the western level, both American and European, and in a manner that guarantees the transformation of Turkey from a country or a member who interviews and enmities, to a centered country that is close to everyone, which was called the multi -dimensional policy ”([61]).

Ahmed Dawoodoglu says in an interview with him (in the fall of 2004): “What I mean from the center of the center is the presence of Turkey in a place close to the geography called“ Afroasia ”, that is, Africa, Europe and Asia, it is here not a state of parties.Turkey is not a parliamentary country. Rather, it is a country that affects several civilizations and is affected by it at the same time.....It is a centered country in terms of historical and cultural aspects.And if we look at the energy flow lines, we find that these lines are lost and waste their way if you delete Turkey from the map, and if we look at the presence of Turkey in the Organization of Cooperation in the Black sea and in the Economic Development Organization and in the Group of Eight G8 (after it was part ofG 20, which is the group of countries that includes 20 southern countries) We find that Turkey is located in the center of political and cultural events in the region and the world.And what no longer plays the role of the spectator on these events and will not be so, but rather in the center of these events ([62]).

Iran's challenge to international will regarding its nuclear program and the development of the means of communicating it is not only with the intention of the regional level, but also at the global level and its continuation of its negative role in the crises file in the region, especially in Iraq, which increases its complexity and obstructing American efforts to get out of its ordeal in this country.They are all data that prompted to think of creating an influential type of budget with the Iranian player through a regional party that has historical and cultural characteristics and religious ties that draw him to the countries of the region to approach the distinguished Iranian performance in these areas.

Given that there is no Arab party that has such advantages and logical fear of throwing Israel in a confrontation that will not serve the basis for balance, because the Arab and Islamic rejection of such a role on the one hand, and because it will give the ideological and political discourse and even the Iranian military credibility and support even among those who are afraid of it, there is no love in it butNaka’a in Israel ([63]).

The Turkish experience seduces wide sectors of Arab elites, with both its Islamists and its secularists.As secularists see an attractive example in protecting secular and democratic values despite the Islamic rise, which usually raises their concerns and anxiety.On the other hand, the Turkish “example” attracts Islamic movements, many of which suffer from exclusion, marginalization and bitter struggle that is not interrupted with political systems in the region, because of looking at the Islamists as a danger to the state and society alike ([64]).

Turkey begged peaceful and diplomatic tools during its endeavor to settle its many conflicts with all neighboring countries. وقد” قدّمت تركيا نفسها كلاعب عادل ومسؤول في السياسة الخارجية في منطقتها، وراغب في تأدية دور الوساطة والمصالحة في كل نزاع سياسي”(([65])).

Turkish diplomacy was able to achieve successes in the Arab -Israeli mediation, especially in the syrian and Lebanese files, which encouraged Turkey to proceed with the Palestinian file after Egypt used it to trust its diplomacy, because Turkey is the European Union gate and a member of the NATO, and the alternative to the Iranian role, which is seekingEgypt is hard to scal it in the region.From the Egyptian point of view, Turkish diplomacy with a "secular face" is able to persuade the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" to accept the Egyptian initiative ([66]).

Turkey has been pursuing a multidimensional foreign policy at all times, and here, here, from multiple dimensions, is the continued walking of its policy on several dimensions at the same time..And if a weakness appears in a dimension, the other dimensions continue without being affected, while the weak dimension is restored after a period of time ([67]).

The National security Adviser to the administration of former Us President George Bush, Gondeza Rice, also described the Turkish "excellent example", noting that it is important to be a state in Turkey's size 99 percent of its Muslim citizens, providing an alternative model for "radical Islam".Rice considered that Turkey has provided Muslims around the world, with a promising model in a modern secular democracy ([68]).

Turkey's Foreign Minister Ahmad Davutoglu was explicit in his sermon in front of Parliament on April 27, 2012 when he said that “a new Middle East is born, and Turkey will be his leader and it is the one who draws his features.” But he set aside all other regional components, Persian, Arabic and Kurdish ([69])).

2- 2- Limits:

The American colonial project towards Iraq represented a new crisis for Turkey, which has lived in its position between standing alongside its strategic ally and loyalty to its history and neighborhood relations that link it to Iraq, so I resorted to adopting a fixed and frank position based on the principle of preserving the unity of Iraq to the land and people, as it sought and to overcomeThe Iraqi crisis is to resort to many roads and channels that would transform without the American invasion of Iraq, which is pushed into by the obsession of the establishment of a Kurdish state to the south of it ([70]).

In the wake of the growing Iranian influence in the region, especially in Iraq and even in Lebanon and Palestine, and this and because of the Arab weakness and its inability to play an influential role, the role of acceptance of the Turkish role, especially from the regimes that have become angry from Iranian influence. These regimes saw that the Turkish -Islamic role represented in the Custice and Development Party.It can be a source to reduce Iranian influence ([71]).During the first eight years of the Custice and Development Party rule.

The reality indicates the lack of confidence in the Turkish leaders of their capabilities on the political and economic move independent of the American will ([72]).

ويرتبط الأمر بالبيئة النفسية المحيطة بصنع القرار السياسي والسياسة الخارجية والمزاج السياسي والمدارك الذهنية عن تركيا لدى الجوار أو الأطراف المعنية بـ”المبادرة”، على أمل، أو إفتراض أن تغيّر البيئة النفسية والشعور بالثقة يزيدان من فرص، أو احتمالات، إعادة النظر في القضايا موضوع النزاع، أو حتى في ترتيبها أو وضعها في جدول الأولويات، وهو ما يحدث بالنسبة إلى عدد من الدول التي كانت على خلاف كبير نسبياً مع تركيا، لكنها اليوم قد لا تُعد تركيا بلداً معادياً، على الرغم من أنه لم يطرأ على القضايا العميقة للنزاع أي تغيير جدي، وإنما حدث نوع من “الإلتفاف” عليها وإبداء حُسن النوايا، ثم طرح مفردات أُخرى تتعلق، بالتبادل التجاري والإعلامي والتنسيق السياسي...etc.، وحتى الآن لم تقم تركيا بالتقدم بمبادرات جدّية لحل نزاعاتها العميقة مع دول الجوار، ولم تتوصل إلى تسويات بشأنها([73]).

Among the challenges also faced by Turkey, the Iranian nuclear file, and the growing regional role of Iran ([74]).

In return, Turkey sees in (Israel) the portal of Europe and its ally against its Arab and Muslim neighbors, it realizes that its rapprochement with (Israel) necessarily means a distance from them.This is at the external regional level, but this may also lead an internal conflict with Islamic groups that are enmity to (Israel) on purely ideological religious foundations ([75]).

However, the Turkish rush towards (Israel) seemed closer to recklessness than it to the natural openness.It is true that some Arabs recognized (Israel) and established relations with it, but it is also true that others have not yet reached a settlement with (Israel), and without this some will not know the region, and it is subject to the dangers of war at every moment, asThis is some, and here is the importance of this, it has common limits as with (Israel) as well with Turkey.Turkey has been in close relations with (Israel) and its standing in the position of the party on the Middle Eastern conflicts, in light of the stumbling of the peace process, makes it far from its goal in playing an influential regional role in any new regional system, and in its transformation into a great regional force from its first conditionsTo stay at the same distance from all parties to the conflicts, and thus Ankara entering a military and political alliance with Tel Aviv reduces the margin of maneuver in front of it and turns it into a party that appears before him the possibilities of profit and loss ([76]).

As for the regional obstacles, Turkey is almost the most countries in the world that have no intimate relations with its neighbors: Bulgaria, Greece, Russia, Armenia, Iran, Iraq and syria;This confirms the weakness of the active Turkish role in the Middle East ([77]).syria and Iraq have been the main obstacle to distinguished relations between Turkey and the Arab world due to the problems of minorities, water problems and borders ([78]).And Russia is increasingly sees that Turkey is a major competition in the Middle East region.Therefore, she continuously sought to curb her efforts to find a strategic geo -foothold in the region, yet Russia remains an important commercial partner for Turkey and is more important to her.This gives her a strong incentive for her relations with Russia and on the basis of equal standards ([79]).

The harmony with America in political and international relations is not prevalent.For example, Turkey's policy towards Iran is not consistent with American policy, and it is also not consistent with American policy, a hundred percent on the Iraqi issue ([80]).

It is worth noting that the developments that have been monitored at the level of Turkish -Israeli relations (after Turkey condemned the heavy bombing of the Palestinian Gaza city, and after what the Israeli forces did to seize a Marmara ship of the Freedom Fleet and the detention of peace activists and humanitarian aid providers to the people Gaza) It does not mean that Turkey dispenses with Israel, so the United states is still a main main force in developing relations between the two countries, which is confirmed by the conduct of the three countries - Turkey, the United states and Israel - joint exercises, and we should not forget that the United states is the compressive element on the European Union to accept Turkey's accession to the union, which Israel strongly supported in its attempt to integrate Turkey away from its Islamic environment and affirming Turkey's interests with the West ([81]).

It is not expected that relations with Israel will worsen, as there is persuasion inside Turkey, for everyone, that the update of the Turkish weapon is an urgent necessity, and that Israel alone is able to carry out this task that cannot be tolerated due to the many regional dangers facing Turkey ([82]).

Turkey does not seem ready to plan policies outside the requirements and requirements of its international (and regional) alliances.You may be willing, but unable, and there are not enough indications that these endeavors will have stable or permanent support by the parties to the international summit, or competing regional parties ([83]).

If the Custice and Development Party stops against the policies of the United states of America and Israel, these two countries can change their ranks in Turkey and move the anti -Custice and Development Party institutions.Although there are important figures from the Custice and Development Party with a good relationship with the Cewish and Masonic lobby ([84]).

Faeq Bulout believes that it requires Turkey's change in its strategy the approval of the United states of America, the European Union, NATO and Israel.It is normal for medium -sized countries like Turkey that it cannot behave in resolving complex issues in the region and its strategic policies.For example, Turkey cannot succeed in resolving the Israeli -Palestinian -Palestinian dispute or the Lebanese internal dispute, even if it wanted to do so.Because this requires the approval of the United states of America, the European Union and Israel ([85]).

There is an internal specific (from inside Turkey).Where a clear paradox appears between the new Ottoman and complete approach: the new Ottoman tends to follow an effective and ambitious regional policy in the Middle East, while perfection adopts a isolationist and cautious policy, and the openness of the new Ottoman is to the liberal cultural and secular pluralism, allowing it to accept the cultural rights of the Kurds and expressionOn the Kurdish national identity, and making way for Islam to play a role in building a common identity, away from the tendency of perfection and the extremists of Turkish nationalists to dissolving the Kurdish cultural and political identity.The new Ottoman is keen on the need to follow up efforts to obtain the membership of the European Union and to maintain good and balanced work and cooperation with the United states.As for the Turkish secular elite, the Middle East represents an exporting area of problems that must be avoided......They consider Islam and cultural and liberal pluralism at the site of hostility to the Al -Kamalia project ([86]).

The Middle East represents a complex challenge to the interactions between Turkey and the European Union, and also represents a circle of linking and widespread strategic obligations, regarding security, stability, balance of power, "control" of conflicts, or potential results from it ([87]).

Turkey's policy was affected as a result of the Western policy of human rights, and the Kurdish issue has become a special source of tension in Turkey's relations with Europe, especially Germany..Interest in human rights also had its great impact on its relations with the United states, and attention in this field in recent years has become strongly influential on the course of the bilateral relationship between the two parties, the obstructing of semen cooperation and the rapid implementation of arms deals to Turkey ([88]).

At the same time, this attention has established its relations with Europe and raised anxiety among many Europeans regarding Turkey's acceptance as a member of the European Union not because of the political, economic and cultural dilemmas caused by its affiliation, but rather because of its fear that this expands the borders of Europe to the Middle East so that Europe finds itself in the depth of the vortex of the region's policies.Turkey's intervention in the Middle East has also sparked new critical dilemmas about its European or Western identity. The more deepened its interest in the Middle East, the more difficult it is against its western orientations and its European identity ([89]).

There are many Turkish moves, and they take place in all directions, not in one direction, but in total, movements of a regional nature, and with unprecedented activities in their style, are not improvised movements or are related to immediate events that occur here or there, but rather movements of a strategic nature,It seems that it will continue to be a permanent need to follow up, understand and perceive.so we are facing a total change of Turkish strategies completely contrary to what the Turkish policy took place from the Cold War until the coming of the Erdogan government ([90]).

تركيا والشرق الأوسط

And if we agree that the Turkish foreign policy is located at the same distance, relatively, from most of the parties, regional and international, the possibility of carrying out the mediations here is also subject to the approval of all parties.And if we assume that all parties agree to the role of Turkish mediation, in this or that issue, then it will only be a "postal box" that transmits the positions of these parties.The "influential mediation" needs an effect papers owned by Turkey, as it does not have important second papers outside the ceiling that the United states may determine to it, and the consequently Israel.This does not seem to be prepared for Turkey's credit for this role ([91]).

Turkish foreign policy, especially since the arrival of the "Custice and Development" party to power in 2002, has witnessed fundamental changes with an important positive characteristic at the internal and external levels, because Turkey has started playing a distinguished and effective role in foreign policy, Arab issues and regional issues in general, which prompted the West To reconsider relations with her in the interest of the strategic partnership in order to solve the troubled issues that can only be resolved by effective regional powers such as Turkey, this has turned Turkey into a center in international politics, trying to employ its active ability to solve problems related to the regional region ([92 ])).

Turkey has pursued a vehicle policy towards the Arab revolutions.Each country looks at an independent situation from the other, but it is proven that Turkey sees itself as a player who has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Arab countries, based on the fact that its stability matters to Turkey and that it provides advice, not dictation ([93]).

And a policy of double standards appeared in more than one file and issue.Turkish Foreign Minister replaced to justify the coup in foreign policy, the theory of problematic with the regimes to whistle with the peoples.But this was only an additional "camouflage" ([94]).This was evident after the events of the so -called (the Arab spring) or the revolutions of the Arab peoples in the last quarter of 2010.

- The security field:

since the crystallization of the Turkish will after 1923, in the form of expressing the logic of the state to the present time and Turkish governments inhabited the effort to dispel its security concern, which states that the safety of Turkish security is related to the important fact that Turkey is a minor force that must either live alongside a great power, or to compete with regional powersLooking for competition ....And in the form of a non -zero game, which depends on confrontation runs ....Perhaps long -term compromise.And as much as the second option, Turkish politicians worry, because of the great ability to take it and a tight employment of inherent capabilities and obstacles, or should be created.Especially in light of Turkey's difficulty, vocabulary, both in domestic politics ....Economic ....Water ....Minorities ....etc.. فإن الخيار الأول كلف وما زال السياسة الخارجية التركية كثيراً وطوق فعلها الذاتي([1]).

External security or defense, pushes Turkey to exercise a job or the role of the "security base" for the West, which is supposed to achieve "security sufficiency" from the great external threats..Turkey's security doctrine focused on the fact that the need for security requires the establishment of political and strategic interactions and alliances that guarantee it a better security position towards the internal and external threat sources.. ويرى الساسة الأتراك أن تركيا تتمتع بموقع جيوستراتيجي مهم للأمن الإقليمي والإستراتيجيات الأميركية والأوروبية، وقد دخل الطرفان (تركيا والغرب) في علاقة تضمن تقديم خدمات أمنية متبادلة([2]).

ويمثّل الشرق الأوسط، حيّز إرتباط واسع الطيف بين تركيا والولايات المتحدة، من الأمـن والإستراتيجيا إلى ضبط النزاعـات، وتشجيع التسويات السياسية، وإحتـواء”الإرهاب”…etc.، وهذا العمل مُعقّد إلى درجة كبيرة، ولذا فهو يتطلب حضوراً سياسياً”متلازماً”و”متعاضداً”بينهما.It "reduces" the requirements of the direct attendance of the United states, or helps them focus its efforts in other regions, but it cannot play a decisive role in solving problems, perhaps because things are more complicated, and require greater material and moral capabilities and resources than Turkey ([3]) requires.

وتقوم تلك الإتفاقيات على أساس مفهوم (الشراكة الأمنية) بين الولايات المتحدة وهذه الأطراف التي تتحمل قسطاً من الدفاع عن أنظمتها وحماية المصالح الأمريكية والدفاع عنها , فيما تتحمل الأولى القسط الآخر عندما يستدعي الأمر تدخلها تدخلاً عسكرياً مباشراًلغرض الحسم وليس البقاء المكثف والمستمر طالما كان للأطراف الأخرى القدرة على إدامة مصالحها من جديد([4]).The main American interest in Turkey's relations with the European Union is a strategic interest;The United states wants to "turn Turkey strongly to the West" because of the importance of the role it plays in NATO in general and to the United states in particular, a role that Turkey can play in protecting the American and Western strategic interests in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus ([5]).Not only created the regional policy that Turkey is consistent with the general options of the Western alliance to which it belongs, results related to the region, but also led to Turkey's loss of its position in the non -alignment movement that was formed from the countries that fought the eruptions of colonialism.Which adopted a letter hostile to colonialism in the alternative center of the International Political Alliance ([6]).so each country, when it focuses on its security field, emerges three pillars in front of it: the motives, ingredients and determinants.

3- 3- 1- The motives:

since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey has not been able to remain immune to the region's policies, especially since the end of World War II.Two are not different in that Turkey is an important country in the Middle East, and a key player in the region's policies, and there is no doubt that the Turks have been aware of the importance and sensitivity of this region, and the nature of relations with its countries, for Turkey and its national security ([7]).

Turkish decision -makers realized that Turkish national security cannot be separated from international trends regarding the Middle East region..Turkey considers itself one of the main players in the region since the second World War and is still despite the change in the global power centers..Turkey has been an important factor in the Western policy in the region, the policy that the Arab world has not accepted since the Baghdad alliance because it believes that it threatens its security and the integrity of its lands and its citizens, but it is for the West, as it is for Turkey formed a major motivation in the face of the soviet Union until its collapse ([[8]).Turkish national security is linked to international policies in the region in an indisputable way.The threats to undermine Turkish national security and the chain of chain of transmission emanate from each of its Middle Eastern neighbors. إن التهديدات ليست تهديدات عسكرية فقط تستدعي ردود فعل عسكري، بل إنها تهديدات للشرعية السياسية لنظام الحكم، وتهديدات لتسامح التنوع الديني والعرقي، وتهديدات لتوفر الموارد الطبيعية الأساسية، وما ينشأ عنها من تهديدات للحفاظ على النمو الإقتصادي([9]).نشأت السياسة التركية وفق رؤيةٍ هوبزية (Hobbesian Vision)، أي سياسات الخوف وليس سياسات القوة، كيف أن الخوف يمثّل دافعاً للحصول على الأمن (وليس القوة)؛ وهذا يختلف مع ما يذهب إليه الأكاديمي التركي، كمال كيريسجي (Kemal Kirisci)، من أن الرؤية الهوبزية لدى تركيا جعلتها تعطي أولوية للقوة العسكرية، كما هو الحال حول البيئة الدولية، وحثّتها على البحث عن تلك القوة والإستعداد لإستخدامها في حسابات”الفوز ـ الخسارة”([10]).Turkey did not come out of the Cold War phase with a sense of enhanced security and reassurance, unlike many other members of the soviet Anti -Federation alliance..In 1993, Turkey's Foreign Minister Hikmat Quttin said: “Turkey has turned into a state confrontation on multiple fronts, due to its geopolitical and geographic location that puts it in the world's least stable, most volatile and mysterious.. ومن الممكن للأزمات والنزاعات التي تقع في هذه المناطق أن تمتد في أي لحظة لتطوق تركيا »([11]).Turkey is an essential stone in the American strategy towards the outside world, especially the Middle East, as it is an advanced base to confront the new enemy of the West, which is the fundamentalist Islam led by Iran in the Arc Crisis, which extends from Aden to Afghanistan, in the Language of Brzensky. فنظام تركيا الديمقراطي العلماني في المجتمع الإسلامي، هو نظام قادر على إستيعاب المسلمين في لعبة الأمم على النمط الغربي([12]).The Turkish strategic planners are Greek and syria - the only two countries that are fighting Turkey on lands - are the main source of external threat. بالإضافة الى تنافس تركيا ورسيا الجيوسياسي على منطقة القوقاز، و تتنافس كل من تركيا وروسيا على الثروات الإقتصادية بالمنطقة([13]).Turkey's proximity to the Middle East also gives it special importance in combating nuclear weapons and defense against ballistic missiles.It is the only member of NATO currently facing a threat to ballistic missiles that may be launched from the Middle East. ولذلك، مع إزدياد تهديد الصواريخ البالستية وإستمرار الولايات المتحدة في بناء منظومة الصواريخ الدفاعية الخاصة بها، من المحتمل أن تُبدي تركيا إهتماماً متزايداً بتطوير منظومة دفاع صاروخي إقليمي بالتعاون مع الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل ولربما حتى مع الهند([14]).Turkey should draw its self -path if it really seeks to ward off new dangers about itself or exploit new opportunities.If the extent of external threats increases, any government official or a rational statesman will seek to neutralize that threat, whether by strengthening the strength of his state or by obtaining new alliances.The new situations require regenerative reactions and responses, and at the same time, the history is filled with models that show what can happen if it is proven that the reactions referred to ([15]).Regional security and its arrangements come at the forefront of the goals that countries seek to build a Middle Eastern system ([16]).And the security of the Middle East as a whole requires the participation of the countries neighboring Iraq in future security arrangements in the region, such as Turkey, Iran, syria and Egypt.The security of the Middle East as a whole requires solving all political problems in the region, especially the Palestinian issue and Lebanon, and understanding about disarmament in the region ([17]).As for Turkey's security interests in the region, it is linked to Western security as well as its desire to turn into a financial center of the Islamic Group in Central Asia. إن هذا التصور عبر عنه تُركت أوزال رئيس وزراء تركيا قبل عام 1990 ثم رئيس جمهوريتها للإعوام التي تلت عقد التسعينات حيث يقول : « نقف بحزم مع الغرب في حلف الأطلسي(*) والمؤسسات المتشابهة، ولكنها في الوقت نفسه تكون جسراً تكون بين الغرب والعالم الإسلامي، وهو الموقف الذي تقف فيه تركيا بإنفراد لكي تُنمي روابط إقتصادية مع الوقت سياسية بين الطرفين »([18]).The horizons of Ankara's policy extended and Turkey became a more assertive and independent player on the international stage.And when Turkey was previously looking towards the West, today it is also attracted to the east and south. ونتيجة لذلك إضطرت تركيا الى أن تُعيد النظر في تحديد مصالح سياستها الخارجية والأمنية وتفكر مجدداً في علاقاتها الدولية([19]).Because Europe has conditions for its acceptance in its club such as (human rights, democracy, removing the military from governance, globalization of economics, opening borders, minority rights, ....etc.) ولأن تركيا لا تستطيع أن تفعلها كلها لسيطرة العسكر ونفوذهم، فإنها وتنفيساً لغضبها أزاء الرفض الأوربي لها، إتجهت الى التحالف الإستراتيجي مع (إسرائيل) والولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، باحثة وراغبة في الخروج من مشكلاتها المتعددة، والتي أدت بالمؤسسة العسكرية الى أن تكون هي الحاكم الفعلي والأساسي بالبلد، برغم أن دستور الدولة يقول بالتعددية الحزبية وبإشاعة الديمقراطية([20]).Turkey uses the capabilities of its security alliances to reduce itself some security problems, prosecute its wanted persons in the countries of the world and arrest them. و لعدم قدرة القيادة التركية على كبح جماح الحركة الكردية في تركيا، فقد لجأت الى حلفائها الغربيين، وخصوصاً الولايات المتحدة تحت حماية القواعد العسكرية الأمريكية والأطلسية الموجودة في كردستان تركيا، لتصبح بالتالي مسؤولة بال في قمع الحركة حفاظاً على المصالح الغربية([21]).وترى كل من تركيا وإسرائيل (في إطار رؤية مشتركة) أن هذا الإتفاق من شأنه أن يجعل البلدين قوة إقليمية مشتركة لها تأثيرها في المنطقة ويمثل ضغطاً على سورية – من وجهة نظرهما – لكي ترضخ وتوقع إتفاقاً مع إسرائيل ينقص من سيادتها على الجولان ويجعلها تتنازل عن الإسكندرونة في جنوبي تركيا([22]).Behind Turkey's motive and desire to join the alliance, which established in 1949 its security concern in addition to its struggle for identity ([23]).European dribbling in accepting the membership of Turkey in the European Union, in addition to the growing Iranian influence significantly in Iraq, Lebanon, syria and the Palestinian territories, and the United states had to have a secret dialogue with Tehran despite the latter's insistence on continuing its nuclear activities, which encouraged Turkey to double its interest in its Arab and Islamic surroundings and indulge in issuesAnd files as long as they are far from it.([24]).تركيا تحاول إستعادة دورها ووزنها بإعتبارها قوة إقليمية في الشرق الأوسط ويبدو أن محاولاتها لإستعادة هذا الدور تأتي في ظل ظروف إقليمية ودولية مؤاتية جداً ولاسيما وأن الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية مرتاحة من هذا الدور وتنظر إليه بشكل إيجابي حيث أنتركيا في البحث عن مخارج للأزمات الإقليمية الراهنة تساهم في إيجاد توازن جديد للحد من النفوذ الإيراني في المنطقة([25]). وتهدف تركيا من خلال وظيفتها التي حددها موقعها « الجيوستراتيجي » بربط مصالح دول المنطقة و العربية خاصة بالمصالح الغربية وبالسياسات الأمنية لحلف شمال الأطلسي وتدعيم المصالح الإستراتيجية الأمنية الأمريكية في المنطقة العربية([26]).This is very difficult, because many Arab countries do not accept Western powers to be valuable for their capabilities and directed to all their policies.

3- 2- The ingredients: Turkey has large military capabilities, humanity, including the mechanism, as it went through in the second chapter (the military establishment), and the soldiers have always been the ones who draw the general policy of Turkey.They are the ones who lead it.Turkey has emerged in the past decade as a great regional player with a huge military force that it uses brilliantly along with its great political weight.This was more evident in the Middle East than anywhere.Turkey's growing interest in the Middle East affairs represents an important shift in its policy, as it was avoided during the rule of Kamal Ataturk - and for a few decades after his death - involvement in the affairs of the Middle East, but in recent years its political interest has increased greatly in the region and was significantly distinguished by great effectiveness that differed from its negative policy thatIt was on it before the Gulf War ([27]).

وإنَّ أهمية الموقع الجغرافي لتركيا انعكس على أداء دورها ووظائفها في المحيط الإقليمي من خلال فاعليتها في النظام الشرق الأوسطي(*) ودورها في المحيط الدولي.Therefore, it is now seeking to revitalize this role towards the region. Thus, the geographical location of Turkey through its view of the Mediterranean and its need for Gulf oil contributed to the development of its regional role in the new Middle East system ..... وبسبب الموقع الجغرافي التركي المتميز في المنطقة فإن القواعد التركية هي الأكثر ملائمة إستراتيجياً للمصالح الغربية فمنها يمكن القيام بمهمات هجومية ضد كل الأهداف المهمة في المنطقة العلوية في الخليج العربي، ومنها تستطيع الطائرات المقاتلة الحديثة إعتراض خطوط الإتصالات والإمدادات الروسية في حالة وقوع هجوم روسي مروراً بإيران وهي الوحيدة من بين جميع قواعد القوات الحليفة التي تسمح لقوات حلف شمال الأطلسي الحيوية بضرب مصادر إنطلاق القوات المهاجمة([28]).The Middle East region is very vital, which considered one of the basic goals of the "American National security strategy" that strategy whose contents have expressed the reformulation of Us security requirements to take advantage of the changes that the international system has witnessed and its employment to find "a world that seeks to establish it and not a world based on its management, In the words of Henry Kissinger, Us secretary of state in President Richard Nixon ([29]). فنظراً لكون تركيا عضواً فاعلاً وأساسياً في ما يُسمى (بالنظام الشرق أوسطي) فإن أحد أبرز وأهم توجهاتها في ذلك النظام المفتوح سيدور في ذلك المحور التعاوني التركي الإسرائيلي وعلى وجه الخصوص العسكري، بإعتبار إنهما قويتان من الناحية العسكرية وحليفتان للغرب تحافظان على مصالحه في المنطقة، وعليه فهما المؤهلتان لأن تكونا في مقدمة دول المنطقة – سيطرةً و إحكاماً – لتحقيق التوازن الإستراتيجي([30]).و لقد أدركت القيادة التركية إن النظام الشرق – أوسطي القادم هو نظام محكوم بالغلبة الإسرائيلية، لكون إسرائيل تُشكل إمتداداً للنظام العالمي الجديد المحكوم بدوره بالغلبة الأمريكية ؛ لذا فإن « الدور التركي الجديد محكوم الى حد كبير بالإستراتيجية الأمريكية – الإسرائيلية »([31]).Turkey's agreements with Israel in particular give the latter the right to use Turkish air bases and can make Israel able to increase the collection of intelligence information by air.And Turkey's strong relations with the United states of America, and its current military agreements with Israel create a serious concern for Iran regarding Turkish intentions in the region. إن إزدياد التعاون العسكري بين تركيا وإسرائيل قد أدى الى ردود فعل قوية في الشرق الأوسط، وصدرت أقوى صيحات المعارضة من سوريا وإيران والعراق ومصر([32]).strategic cooperation between the two countries - Turkey and Israel - reached an advanced degree, especially in terms of developing military industries (electronic devices, aircraft), conducting joint maneuvers, using military bases, preparing joint development plans (for agricultural investments in the Cab project area), promoting trade and tourism exchanges. إتسمت العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية بالتفاعل والتعاون , بل وصلت إلى حدود الشراكة الإستراتيجية في عدد من المجالات ولاسيما التعاون العسكري ومشاريع المياه , وإتفاقية التعاون العسكري عام 1996 دليلاً واضحاً على ذلك والتي كانت تتويجاً لمسيرة العلاقات الثنائية منذ أن بدأت رسمياً عام 1948([33]).The Turkish -Israeli military agreement was announced in early April 1996 .....In the same month, former Turkish President suleiman Demirel visited Egypt, and announced that the agreement was aimed at combating terrorism and only normalizing relations with Israel ([34]).The Middle East system provides the opportunity for Turkey to interfere in security arrangements in the Arab Gulf region, so Gulf security, according to Turkish perceptions, is part of the security of the Middle East, and then the political problems of the region in general should solve the Palestinian issue and the problem of disarmament. أضف إلى ذلك أن أقطار الخليج تدرك جيداً أن التوازنات الإقليمية والمحلية هي أفضل نظام يشبع حمايتها ولهذا فهي ترى في علاقاتها مع تركيا كدولة جوار جغرافي للخليج العربي، في ظل اتفاقات مع قوى غربية كبرى، هي الأكثر تحقيقاً والأضمن للأمن والاستقرار، وهنا يكون الدور التركي أكثر تقبلاً واستساغة من قبل الأقطار الخليجية التي هي الأكثر حاجة للإستقرار الحقيقي وليس الظاهري([35]). فالعدالة والتنمية سيحاول لعب ورقة الجيش كقوة تدفع تركيا إلى الأمام في العلاقات مع الإتحاد الأوروبي ومع الولايات المتحدة الأميركية وضمن منطق تعزيز دور وموقع تركيا إقليمياً ودولياً([36]).The containment is the most severe principle of politics and the most certainty arts, because it is an original effectiveness, and Turkey, or any international unity, without it, is not, as if it is a defense system inherent to it, but not without change.Turkey is planning a complex strategy for containing.Turkey had no material and moral resources to establish "independent" containment strategies, especially with the "large" challenges and the multiplicity of threat sources.. وهكذا فقد “إنخرطت” تركيا في إستراتيجيات الإحتواء الغربية خلال العقود الماضية، وكانت في معظم الأحيان عامل تنفيذ أو “تأهيب” لسياسات بعينها، ولم تبرز كفاعل”مستقل”أو”مؤثر”في تلك السياسات إن إستراتيجيات الإحتواء التي تتبعها تركيا تجاه مختلف التحديات الداخلية والخارجية لا ترتبط بالدولة التركية فقط، وإنما أيضاً بتحالفاتها الخارجية([37]).Turkey can play the role of guarantor for security and stability in the Middle East, which glorifies its strategic strength in the new international system, the center of the United states of America and the unified Europe. On the third side, this is more than the criterion of Turkish self -power, in the face of Iraq and Iran in the arc of the crisis extending from Aden toAfghanistan ([38]).This balance remained in favor of Iran, and Iraq for a long time..

3- 3- 3- المُحددات :يُعد الخيار التركي – الغربي هو الخيار الإستراتيجي عبر ثلاثة أرباع القرن العشرين، أما العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية فهي عامل مساعد لإنجاز هذه الإستراتيجية، وتعد ثمناً مدفوعاً من القيادة التركية على حساب رصيدها من مجتمعها المسلم الذي تعارض أغلبيته هذا التوجه نحو إسرائيل، وبخاصة مع تصاعد المد الإسلامي بإضطراد([39]).Turkey cannot solve its national security problems through military means mainly.Because Turkish national security also depends on preserving its political legitimacy, preserving its community on religious and ethnic tolerance, providing basic natural resources (such as oil and water) and the state's development of economic capabilities. إن التهديدات لكل من هذه المتغيرات المتكاملة، وكذلك فرص زيادة قدرات الأمن القومي، تنبثق من منطقة الشرق الأوسط([40]).Turkey's rise in an important role in any "regional security arrangements" depends mainly on the durability of its relations with the United states of America and Israel, and these relations in Israel guarantee Turkey a leadership role even if it takes the image of the "second / smaller partner" of the latter in regional economic arrangements.Rather, the relations of the alliance with Israel have achieved more goals in Turkey in the region, including "the transition to a nuclear force in 2020" ([41]).When formulating a balanced and complex national security policy for the Middle East, politics in Turkey must consciously achieve integration between their internal and external policy options to respond to the integration of variables ([42]).Turkey is of medium importance - if not small - strategically in the service of Israel as a state and as a location.But political, economic and moral services are very high from the Turkish side. فإذا إستثنينا مشروعات المياه والإشتراك في مواجهة الأصولية الإسلامية وتحجيم العراق وهي أمور مهمة بالنسبة لإسرائيل – لا تُشكل تركيا دوراً محورياً فيها بسبب فيضان المشاعر الإسلامية فيها ضد إسرائيل، فإن تركيا تستفيد من إسرائيل بأكثر مما تستفيد إسرائيل([43]).Terrorism is another foreign issue that has a serious impact on Turkey's security visions.And that the number of assassinations that affected Turkish officials and media professionals in recent decades and the continuation of terrorism of the right and left wing inside Turkey has deepened Turkey's sensitivity to the dangers of international terrorism and gave Ankara a strong interest to fight its spread.This could be important in Turkey's relations with the United states, especially if a number of Turkey's neighbors or groups inside move to carry out terrorist attacks on the Turkish bases from which American forces operate.([44])."Our relations with Israel are normal and poured into the interests of Turkey.And the fact that it serves Turkey's interests, this does not mean that they are against the interests of other countries. إن تركيا مستفيدة من قوتها العسكرية، ومن عضويتها في حلف الأطلسي، في سعيها الى ال بفعالية في مشروعات الأمن الإقليمي”([45]).But Turkey was not just a "executive arm" for the West in the region, as this is a simplification of matters, although it was justified in many cases, and it may involve more important contents, so Turkey heading towards the West cannot directly direct regional policy in dangerous areas, and cannot do serious actionsWithout an international cover or a major security umbrella. ومن ثم فقد نظرت طويلاً إلى المنطقة من منظار الغرب([46]).That is why we find the European Union that does not adhere to Turkey's membership in the NATO, especially after the communist danger from Europe has disappeared, but rather that he looked at this membership as the bridge to pass Washington's introductory policy to include Turkey for its membership, and what this means is the transfer of its conflicts with other countries within its corridors, especially its conflictWith Greece around Cyprus ([47]).The European Union wants Turkey to be a strong and stable country, not a member of its federation.وهنالك رأي يذهب إلى أن تخلي الولايات المتحدة والغرب عن تنمية قوة الجيش التركي ومحاولة تفكيكه هو محاولة من قبل الدوائر الغربية لنزع السلاح والتقليل من قوة الجيوش في الشرق الأوسط حفاظاً على أمن (إسرائيل) التي ستصبح أكبر قوة عسكرية في المنطقة بحالة غياب أية قوة منافسة([48]).تمثّل المسألة الكردية عامل”صِدام”أو”صراع”بين تركيا والولايات المتحدة في عدد من الوجوه على الرغم من أنها هي نفسها عامل تنسيق وتحالف لجهة إلتزام الولايات المتحدة بأمن ووحدة تركيا بإعتبارها عضواً في حلف الناتو([49]).لذلك فإن كثيراً من المراقبين في أنقرة إستبعدوا إمكان التوصل إلى حلول مبكرة للمشكلة الكردية , ما لم تتعلم تركيا كيف تتعايش مع تفاعلات هذه المشكلة , في إنتظار تسوية ترتبط بعملية إعادة ترتيب خريطة الشرق الأوسط([50]).فالدولتان (تركيا وإسرائيل) وقعتا إتفاقاً أمنياً في مجال مكافحة الإرهاب والجريمة المنظمة والتهريب والمخدرات والهجرة غير المشروعة، حيث تقوم تركيا بدور الوسيط الأمني بين الدول المهمة المحيطة بها للتنسيق وتبادل المعلومات([51]).وعلى الرغم من تعاون تركيا مع إسرائيل، لتبحث عن دور لها في المنطقة عن طريق إسرائيل، أو إنها تحاول الإستفادة من الدعم الأمريكي عن طريق الأخيرة، إلا أن إسرائيل تمثل منافساً لتركيا([52]).

3- 3- The economic field:

Economic problems and border problems have detonated many crises and conflicts between countries.Although the concept of security is linked to military security, security has other strategic, economic and social ingredients that are difficult to neglect, all of which are linked to the national interest of the state..The concept of security and its subject represents a prominent position in the thinking of any country as the focus of foreign policy of the states.Any military, political, or economic threat is considered the same danger that threatens the security of this or that state, makes it keen to confront it, whether by force or by drawing policies and certain strategies that lead to the same purpose ([1]).

Turkey dealt with the Middle East - during several decades - through its involvement in the strategies of the West in it, and often looked at it with "Western eyes", but the matter has changed relatively in the last decades of the twentieth century, as it began to look at the region as an important field of its international and regional interactions([2]).The element of survival was the prevailing concern in the Cold War stage, and Turki achieved this element ([3]).

In the 1970s, Turkey turned again towards the Middle East, and this was a reaction to the Western opposition of the Turkish demands in Cyprus, as well as because of the oil crises in that era..And the Turkish -Arab doubts, mutual, whose roots date back to the policies of the Ottoman Empire, remained an obstacle to developing closer relations from the Arab countries in the Middle East ([4]).

Energy security is also the factor that directs Turkey's attention to the Middle East.Turkey's interests in the Middle East are increasingly highlighting what is related to energy security and determining its position on the means that the West gets energy from the region, but also one of the means that it seeks to secure its own growing needs of energy for the future ([5]).The main entrance to security arrangements requires the expansion of economic cooperation between the countries of the region, such as establishing joint projects, abolishing commercial restrictions, and strengthening economic integration opportunities ([6]).

وتهتم تركيا بصنع سياسة خارجية نشطة في المجال الإقتصادي، وتنطوي السياسة الخارجية التركية في أبرز ملفاتها مثل: الإنضمام إلى الإتحاد الأوروبي، والعلاقات الإستراتيجية مع الولايات المتحدة وإسرائيل... على مضامين إقتصادية بارزة، حتى أن الساسة الأتراك يبررون تلك السياسات، حينما يتحدثون أمام مواطنيهم، بأسباب إقتصادية، بإفتراض أنها تحقق مصالح إقتصادية تنعكس إيجاباً على مستوى المعيشة في تركيا، وهذا يعني أن الإقتصاد السياسي للسياسة الخارجية يُمارس حضوراً أكثر فاعلية اليوم منه في السابق([7]).And because Turkey has an economic project that exceeds its geographical borders, this economic field has become in the Turkish strategic trend towards the Middle East region, motives, ingredients and determinants.

3- 3- 1- The motives:

Turkey has sought to improve its national economy in several methods, due to the impact of its economic situation on its security situation, and that one of the main motives for the southeast Anatolia project is to confront the calls of the PKK by improving the economic situation in the southeast of the country with the Kurdish majority, and thus increasing the legitimacy of the system of government inRegion.This project has also exerted Turkish economic sources for achieving a complex goal, which is agricultural development to increase economic capabilities and electrical energy supplies to reduce dependence on energy imports from abroad ([8]).

In 1990, the Turkish Minister of state, responsible for the Ghab Project, expressed Turkey's ambition to claim the Middle East region, where he said: With the dissolution of the systems of blocks and major leaders as a result of the developments in the world and Eastern Europe, the issue of regional leadership systems will be raised, and Turkey will become the leader of the Middle EastIn the future ([9]).

The involvement of Israel in water projects, and the determination of the Turkish leadership to implement the peace pipelines project will support the Turkish position and have support that justifies its position in front of world public opinion, the European Parliament and human rights organizations that its war on Kurds is not a violation of human rights but a defense

On Turkish sovereignty and combating terrorism ([10]).

The Islamists have spoken of a common Islamic market, and that such gatherings may become a necessity in this changing world quickly.And if such a project appears to exist, Turkey will be an important partner in such an institution ([11]).

The available opportunities are similarly diverse, especially the chances of increasing economic capabilities through greater trade and investments, and the opportunities for increase provides energy supplies, and opportunities to solve ethnic split (we mean the Kurdish), and through this providing opportunities to support the legitimacy of the system of government ([12]).

Enhancing the opportunities for Turkey to join the European market, by strengthening Turkish ties with the West and their awareness - that is, Turkey - the extent of the American -Israeli influence on the countries of Europe ([13]).

Turkey sees in its accession to the European Customs Union and the abolition of customs duties on its exports to Israel;Which will encourage relations between them and reach large rates.In addition, strengthening Israeli relations with Israel is the first ally of the United states of America in the region, which will enhance Turkey's position in its negotiations with international financing institutions to obtain loans that support Turkish economic reform, and opens the door of Western and Gulf investments at home ([14]).

He made the Liberal Custice and Development Party in the economy and the governor in society's issues, and since its arrival in power, the implementation of the application of reforms at an unprecedented pace ([15]).Turkey seemed more interested in playing a regional role in a relative level of distinction from the West, in economic and political issues, it is true that it is an unstable player, but it may be chances of work to work on its priorities ([16]).Turkey seeks to become part of the Middle Eastern framework proposed in partnership based on oil, water, trade, money and multi -directional cooperation ([17]).

And its continuous confirmation of its intention to establish the water project called "Peace Pipes", which, if it is implemented, will enable it to perform a political and economic role in the region - providing the border areas with energy and irrigation sources, and making it the potential food basket for the Middle East countries -.Turkey's politicians believe that the Middle East market, if it is better to arbitrate the Turkish site, will be the central pole, the axis of interests, the center of gravity, and an important economic and political attraction in the Middle East ([18]).

Turkey also plans to keep electric power transmission lines with a number of neighboring countries in the Middle East, and it also imports small amounts of electrical energy from Iran..These lines may not contribute much to Turkey's total needs of energy, but they have a political significance by being helping to overcome some discounts inherent with its direct neighbors ([19]).

Likewise, the power transmission lines, Ahmed Davutoglu says: “If we look at the power flow lines, we find that these lines are lost and waste their way if you delete Turkey from the map, as it passes through Turkey the oil and natural gas pipelines and Baku oil lines - Tablis and Cihan,Kirkuk pipelines - mourning and other pipelines ([20]).

3- 2- ingredients:

The policy makers are internal policy options that address the Kurdish demands for cultural and living rights through the (Al -Cab) project, and this will lead to a separation of the separatist call to the PKK.Turkey can include in its own accounts the economic benefits to attract more international investments in the (Al -Cab) project if the dispute is settled ([21]).

The political economy represents one of the important entrances in the analysis of Turkish policy;The economic dimension of foreign policy means focusing on its role in the state's obtaining the "rent" of material (and moral) resources, that is, the economic and political rent in the first place.Thus, foreign policy becomes a way to maximize economic gains and trade interactions, obtain rent and a means to secure the political and security inputs of the state. أما السياسات الريعية فتصف الخطط والسلوكيات والبرامج المنفّذة والأوضاع التي تستهدف الحصول على الدعم الإقتصادي والمساعدات المادية والمعاملة التفضيلية والإستثمارات…etc.، وثمة وجه آخر للسياسة الريعية عندما تهدف إلى تحصيل المكاسب المادية من مصادر خارجية، مثل تلقّي المساعدات والمعونات الخارجية لأسباب سياسية وأمنية (… الخ)([22]).

The construction of the regional trend of Turkey is only by strengthening the economic trend of Turkey, especially towards the Arabian Gulf, and its Asian orientation, in addition to the military and political tasks that have a western direction, is also in a sentence of economic endeavor ([23]).

One of the group of relations in the Middle East, which Turkey can adopt more active or strength, is with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries.There is a clear benefit in encouraging trade between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Turkey, and Turkish construction companies in the (Arab) Gulf, in addition to investments in Turkey that can help strengthen its economy ([24]).

It should be noted that both Riyadh and Cairo may find themselves pushing for further enhancing their relationship with Ankara, whether because of the consensus between them on the position on the Iranian nuclear file on the one hand and the keenness it contains to limit the expansion of Tehran's influence in the region, or a desire to achieve important economic gains by virtue ofThe possibilities provided by the Turkish market for either state ([25]).

والتفاعلات الإقليمية المتعددة مثل العلاقات مع كل من سورية والعراق وإيران ودول الخليج العربية...etc.، بهدف تعظيم فرص التبادل التجاري والإستثمارات المشتركة والتسهيلات الإقتصادية والمعاملات التفضيلية... الخ([26]).

The United states of America supports the role of Turkey and Israel and its position in the Middle East, as Turkey wants to play a prominent regional role through its geosus, human and economic capabilities ([27]).The waterproof entry and Israeli -Turkish military cooperation can be considered one of the most important entrances through which Turkey tries to enhance its role and position in the Middle East framework ([28]).

The level of Turkish -Israeli relations was not limited to the security -military side only, but also to the economic field and commercial cooperation and the establishment of free commercial and industrial areas between them known as “Al -Kwais projects” ([29])

ويُلاحظ أن التنظير “المقترح” من قبل أحمد داوود أوغلو، الذي تسترشد به حكومة حزب العدالة والتنمية يتطلب، إلى جانب المكانة الإقليمية والدولية وبناء الثقة... الخ، موارد مادية، ويتطلب ذلك بدوره تفاعلات إقتصادية وتبادلاً تجارياً وإستثمارات وشراكات مع الدول الأُخرى.This is reflected in the internal support of the party's policies, and helps it enable its authority and hold the state's general policies, and the process enters into feeding feeding and interactive support, as is the case with policies of this type ([30]).

The Turkish economy is classified as free economics in the world, and the seventy -fourth country is considered the most freedom of economy within the world and thirty -two within the forty -one European countries, where the percentage of economic freedom (8, 60 %) was according to the 2008 assessments..As a result of the implementation of the reformist economic program, Turkey has made remarkable progress in this field, and Turkey can be described as within the economies of the active market if it strongly maintains stability and reform achievements that have been achieved recently ([31]).

It seemed clear that foreign funds inside Turkey began to have a high acceleration during the recent period..But the start of the reforms, raised the outcome to three billion dollars in 2004, and to ten billion in 2005 and 20 billion after only one year in 2006, while the first months of 2007 witnessed more than 10 billion dollars..The economic boom achieved by the Turkish economy in recent years formed a great surprise to the economists, after a general consensus in the global economy sector prevailed on the continued weak infrastructure of the Turkish economy and its weak competitiveness..The year 2007 came to confirm the recovery of the Turkish economy, as the levels of growth returned to its previous rates, and it is expected that Turkey will turn from a developing country into a sophisticated developing country during the next decade ([32]).With the development of oil and gas transportation from Caspian and the Middle East to the world's markets, Turkey also emerges as a country that can be a global commercial center for energy and maritime transport, especially for Europe ([33]).

3- 3- Limits:

Turkey's contribution to the “Middle East” project will remain dependent on its economic capabilities and political developments in it, as well as regional and international developments, as these factors limit the Turkish role “Middle East”, which depends mainly on cooperation in the fields of water and security in the foreseeable term ([34]).

The GAP project - Building a group of dams costs 30 billion Us dollars and is known as the southeast Anatolia project - will not fully achieve all these goals unless policymakers are able to solve its international contents, especially the threat imposed by this project on determining the quantities of water to syriaAnd Iraq.By creating the threat of syria's supplies from water, the (GAP) project leads to syria's desire to encourage the separatist PKK ([35]).Damascus has responded by allowing the Kurdistan Workers' Party fighters to work against Turkey from the syrian territories ([36]) (from the end of the eighties until the signing of the Adana agreement on 11/20/1998 to end the crisis between the two parties).

The Custice and Development Party projects are narrow and not a realistic alternative.The Custice and Development Party reforms are important in terms of showing the hidden and hidden dynamics of Turkey.This cannot happen without problems and crises.In addition, Turkey is not only the Custice and Development Party, the army, the army, the Islamists and the secularists only ([37]).

Because Turkey needs to import about 60 % of energy sources, it has headed towards the countries of the Middle East to obtain a large part of the energy imports.And most of these in the form of oil and natural gas.Most of Turkey's imports of Gulf oil [Arab] come.....This means most of its imports comes from the Kingdom of saudi Arabia and Iran, (and the other is the important equipped for Turkey with oil).....Therefore, the Turkish economy has an important interest in maintaining stability in the Gulf [Arab] region, and in [obtaining] Gulf oil at a reasonable price ([38]).

Despite the presence of trade agreements and economic cooperation between both Russia and Turkey, as well as between Iran and Turkey, Turkey has a history of rivalry and conflicts that spanned for centuries with both Iran and Russia, even if the Turkish Foreign Ministry officials are trying hard to deny the existence of any hostility towards any of its neighbors, But there is no evidence of the end of that date ([39]).

The most important measure to prevent possible polarization is that Turkey develops and diversifies bilateral relations with Arab countries, by expanding the yard of common interests.Turkey must take care of its relations with Iran, as it is the non -Arab Islamic state in the region to counter the possibility of attracting that may appear on the scene.The Turkish -Iranian relations that are active when the Turkish -Arab relations reach a dead end, are the only factor to confront oneness in the region ([40]).so Turkey stands against any economic sanctions against Iran* due to the negative repercussions of such sanctions on the Turkish economy in terms of energy import and investments ([41]).

Turkey's new relations with Israel provide support in basic areas of economic growth and military security.The possibility is still based on the Israeli conflict that has not been settled with the Palestinians, especially in the matter of refugee rights and the status of the city of Cerusalem, may lead to internal pressure in Turkey that imposes on the government to determine this relationship ([42]).

Although there is a general consensus in the circles of making Turkish policy on the anti -external nature, in addition to unprecedented opportunities to achieve economic gains and promote national prestige, we cannot say the same about choosing the appropriate path imposed by such considerations.The dialogue on this issue is affected by the legacy that Turkey's historical experience and the structures of its internal institutions and the standard reference vision that its foreign policy will be based ([43]).And that the regional Turkish movements are interfered with other regional powers such as Russia, China, and Iran, through regional organizations, such as the Caspian sea Organization countries, and the countries of shanghai ([44]).The margin of Turkey's movement economically and politically is somewhat difficult for the presence of strong competition parties there.

It is true that Turkey has a lot of customs agreements and mutual investment with the European Union, but the latter has a lot of appearance in the issue of accepting Turkey's request for membership in the European Union, and Turkey has lost a lot because of the break of its relations with the Arab and Islamic countries and sometimes these relations take the form of conflict or crises and tension (with IraqAnd syria in particular) and for many decades during its endeavor to join.The Turkish impasse is based on the fact that after a forty -year march, it is not possible to retreat in any way, and Turkey has no other alternative ([45]).

Conclusion :

In the conclusion of our study, we can say: The rapid and severe fluctuations and changes that Turkey have gone through since mid -2002 (specifically) and beyond a serious shift in its contemporary political, social and economic travel.The Custice and Development Party (Islamic origins) receives power for the first time in its participation and its superiority over the rest of the competing parties in the legislative elections that took place on October 3, 2002, but rather it exceeded it to the various signs and implications for this event..The first of which is the emergence of one party (justice and development) that was able to achieve a parliamentary majority that enables it to form a government alone, so the phenomenon of governments (the weak) formed from the families (often was violated with each other) since the early eighties of the east century, and during this period it was only an exceptionOne about that reality represented by the arrival of Turkot or Izal to the brick of ministers (twenty years ago).His government was weak, so Turkey fell since the early 1990s in the cycle of the emergence of government formations, so the Grand National Council (Parliament) withdraws confidence from it, then it is announced for early elections and another government appears to be the power of the forces, and so was the case..

The second thing is the displacement of traditional political cadres (diverse and conflicting among themselves) has been in control of political life since the beginning of the emergence of partisan pluralism in Turkey in a year, as it was not recorded in a major shift in public policy in Turkey because these cadres were exchanging positions and addresses among them in the elections, And severe harassment (to the extent of the prohibition of activity) - which was practiced by the military institution - imposed on Islamic parties and Kurdish parties or those sympathetic to the Kurdish movement, or that accept or demand to give Turkey Kurds some political and cultural rights or recognize them as a national minority that lives in Turkey, and also on Left parties and national parties, especially those that have been made with extremism, and therefore the political process in Turkey has become a stadium for the political milieu only, and all parties competing for the government belong to this current (the center).This led to the political performance of the parties of Turkey the 1970s to the elapsed century, until the legislative elections were held before the end of 2002.

The third thing is the emergence of a new leadership of the Islamic political movement led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, after it was subject to the star of religion Erbakan from the 1960s and until the legislative elections in 2002.

Because this party has a vision and a message that differs from other parties that preceded it (secular and Islamic) in the rule of the country, as a result, it has a strategic orientation of its own and depends on different implementation methods in its internal policy and foreign policy.The least we could say is that it gave Turkey a new image and gave it many gains during this period.

Most countries of the Middle East and Western and Asian countries view the experience of the Custice and Development Party with great attention.Whereas, many interested people and students in the field of Islamic political parties go by saying that the Custice and Development Party is a model for a new Islamic -political system and in new faces and ideas, which seeks to harmonize between Western values and Islamic identity and is silent between social Westernization and the rooting of national cultureAmong the members of the Turkish people and works to reconcile the political, social and economic moods that exist in Turkey with its mood to attract more support (official parties and informal parties) from within the country, and create a combination of behaviors accepted by Islamic and non -Islamic countries.

The founders of the Custice and Development Party have known from the beginning the difficulties and obstacles that they will face as they carry principles and trends that contradict or intersect with many internal parties, as well as external forces whose effects cannot be ignored on them.Followers and people of the political parties in Turkey can notice the extent of the benefit obtained by the Custice and Development Party from the experiences of other Islamic parties, and even the non -Islamic that preceded it to go into political action in Turkey in theory and practical, materially and morally.

We can say that the Custice and Development Party is a party born from the epics of the lives of Islamic opposition parties in Turkey, so the party took several ideas and sought to implement them, believing from the members of the party's leadership that these ideas are what will achieve Turkey, which they envision its future and aspire to build it.Among these ideas: the new Ottoman, Turkey Kemalia, the Turkish Diguli.

There were four reasons behind the continued victory of the Custice and Development Party in the subsequent elections, as one studies go: economic achievements.stability and political reforms.And achieve regional and international weights for Turkey.And Carsma Erdogan.

Ahmed Davutoglu said: “Turkey should be defined in the new stage as a center country.”.

Through a comprehensive and wide view, it can be said, that the Middle East is a vital square for Turkey and occupies a large part of its comprehensive strategy, and in order to succeed in achieving its goals in this region, it has placed three directions for itself:

It must go with these three trends without interrupting each other orer orientation, in order to achieve their major goals and goals..

Each of these trends has strong justifications, which insist on Turkey in moving forward to go into it to achieve its higher goals and interests, first and foremost.We cannot neglect the effect of each of these three orientations directly on each other, in order to condemn or meet and intersection - sometimes - the national interests of all these international units that fall within the Turkish strategic trends..

- Although the United states of America has concluded many bilateral and multilateral agreements and alliances with the countries of the Middle East, it (the United states) resorted to what is known as regional agents who could depend on them, and from these Turkey and Israel, to take over with it nowAnd from it in the future, the arrangement of the region politically and security and under its supervision directly, in a way that guarantees it to achieve its national interests in this region..

The nature of Turkey's relations and alliances with the countries of the regions -the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Balkans -and the European Union and the United states of America and a number of countries in the world and the intertwining and complexity of these relations, made Turkey stand, deal and cooperate with countries on the opposite parties -between these same countries -,As its relationship with the Arab countries and its defense of the Palestinian people and their issues on the one hand, and its relationship with Israel and its strategic alliance at the same time.And as her relationship with the United states on the one hand, and its relationship to Islamic countries at the same time.

Turkey is a member of the NATO and the European Council and seeks to membership of the European Union, but at the same time it is a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and it seeks to establish the “Turkish University or the Turkish world” with the republics of Turkish origins in Central Asia, similar to some national organizations, such as the League of Arab statesOr those similar to the European Union.

All these facts make most of Turkey's friends and enemies look at its movements with suspicion and lack of reassurance.

One of the things that helped the acceptance of Turkey among the countries of the Middle East is the rise of a new and moderate Islamic (Custice and Development Party) to the Turkish Policy Industry Center, and to obtain great public support and occupy the first rank in the parliamentary and municipal elections that took place in the last quarter of the year2002.This new factor expressed several times from the beginning that it will work hard to return good relations with Islamic countries.

Political relations between Turkey and most of its neighboring countries (and Iraq in particular) were full of problems and tensions, and with the coming of the Custice and Development Party of rule, he tried to save Turkey from these problems with several methods and the title that was prominent in these methods is (harmonious diplomacy).

Conclusions:

- strategic orientation and politics are evaluated based on the results it achieves, not through the aspirations or perceptions it carries - in mental imaginations or verbal discussions - virtual or strategic plans that remain ink on paper or agreements and treaties whose lines did not come to the application, that is, the strategic directionIt is measured only by its outputs.

_ The vocabulary (effectiveness, actor) is used in political and social writings and expressions, and others, but it is not specified as a concept or term in the strategy.

Effectiveness: an intended move to a result, based on self -motives, which may take from the use of others to fulfill its goals.

- security stability, economic power, and transcendence of sovereignty from the rest of the other countries can be considered auxiliary factors in the effectiveness of the state between other countries.

Among the factors that help the emergence of effectiveness are the spiritual factor and state behavior, that is, the extent of the state's ability to develop its prestige sources (its spiritual impact - depending on the religious aspect or its historical and human depth between the rest of the international units - international) or its national personality or its ideology or its leadership enthusiasm and its diplomatic skills.By claiming and taking responsibility for addressing the issues of the region.

The nature of policies, the level of relations intertwined between international units, issues that occupy their interest, and the type of alliances between them, and the difference between the capabilities and capabilities of international units, all represent a assistant or specific factors for the effectiveness of international unity among the rest of the units.

- Effectiveness must be evaluated by examining the size and type of movement within the framework of achieving national security and higher interests, knowing the cost of movement, and studying the results of the move, so that we can judge that this state is effective or ineffective.

-The initiatives must be included in the state's foreign policy work program with logical and seriousness, and according to the principle of priority -the most important and then important -and this business schedule must not be greater than the ability of the immediate actual implementation -that is, greater than the ability of the state, so the unity of the foreign policy industry -specifically- To warn of the emergence of the gap between what you contemplate, what you declare and what you are able.

- The judgment on the effectiveness of an international unit, or not, in its regional or international midfield, cannot be true through a position or two positions or through the strength of its impact on a state or two states, but the issue is much more complicated than this.

The most important motives for the Turkish strategic trend towards the Middle East region are due to the following reasons:

self: Its basis is divided into:

* Material: the basis for Turkey's need for energy sources (crude oil and natural gas) and markets to drain its products, the Middle East region represents its vital field that allows it to establish commercial and economic relations beneficial to its national interests.

* Myself: The basis of emotional arousal, personal motivation, and the feeling of Turkish decision -maker that he is able to lead the countries of the region or be better than them all..

- The Custice and Development Party has a lot of a modified policy on the policy of governments that preceded it, as he conducted a lot of modifications in order for its policy to become effective in the medium term in order to avoid the mistakes of previous policies, and be careful not to make a gap or an imbalance in its performance, and withoutA change in most of the essence of Turkey - previous - foreign policies.

- Weak performance and political management among Iraqi officials and the lack of clarity in a correct vision to achieve the interests of the country and in light of a volatile environment and has many problems that made Iraqi foreign policy weak in its reactions to Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq.

The Iraqi government has been trying since 2005 and so far to show Turkey its power through its alliance and closeness to Iran, whenever relations are tense between Turkey and Iraq..

- The security and political vacuum left by the United states of America after its withdrawal from Iraq, in which Turkey saw the best opportunity to work without this desire to conflict with what the United states of America wants (to prevent Iran's influence from expansion in Iraq) and from Iraq (a successful democratic rule model) at the same time.

- The Turkish government is certain that Iraq will play an important role in building its national security (against the PKK) or it can undermine it when the Labor Party resorts to the depth of land in northern Iraq to cover up or start an attack from it, as well as the links of the PKK with Kurdish partiesAn Iraqi popular and official.And for Turkey's certainty that the issue of the Kurdistan Workers Party has not ended with the arrest of its president (Abdullah Ocalan) or will end after a truce that is not known when it ends and for dramatic reasons.National demands and rights do not end with the death of its president or by arresting him.And it does not end with the death of those calling for it and the fighters in its path, as it is not the issue of a few people, but rather the issue of a nation.

- The growth of Turkey's interests in Iraq (and the economic ones specifically) made it increase in interest and preoccupation with the issues of Iraq and its affairs, to the extent that it allows itself to interfere in its internal affairs..

- Turkey was putting the issue of water (the Tigris and the Euphrates) with the rest of its outstanding issues with Iraq and syria (the problem of the Kurdistan Workers Party and the issue of the aspirations of the Kurds of Iraq - their demands for self -rule and then federalism and may develop into independence in the future - and the issue of its demand for the Mosul Brigade and the issue of the Turkmen minority in KirkukAnd the problem of the Orontes River) together in its negotiations with them, to achieve an element of pressure on both countries to achieve advanced gains on them (united or individually) in their talks with it..While the problem of water between them (Turkey - Iraq and Turkey - syria) is a technical and legal problem in its essence and it must be kept away from the political and security influences between its parties..

Turkey depends a lot on the method of bargaining in its international relations, especially with Iraq.

- In Turkey's foreign policy towards Iraq, the economic aspect is far from the political side that is tense from time to time for many reasons, as it does not allow its economic and investment relations to be affected with Iraq because of its political relations charged with tension.Turkish decision makers see that the strength of the Turkish economy is the strongest factory that will help them accept their joining the European Union after the Custice and Development Party contained some reasons and got rid of some of those who stand without Turkey joining the European Union with internal reforms.

Turkey sometimes acts as if it has a solution and a contract regarding the affairs of the region, and deals a lot with the countries of the region as the strong member of NATO to deter them from actions or motivation for them.

- Through the indications and indicators that the researcher has gone through, it turns out that the effectiveness of Turkey increases as its relations are stronger with the United states of America and the margin of its movement becomes broader and its initiatives and its presence will be an implementation.Many of Turkey's initiatives and movements in the Middle East region are suitable, and sometimes its contents are identical to the aspirations of the United states of America and Israel, as it is a: righteousness, which appears to be similar in its foreign policy with the policies of the United states and Israel..

- Turkey has two types of effectiveness, namely (authentic effectiveness) and (acquired effectiveness) that are evident according to the type and size of the issues and affairs in which they are fighting.

- The events experienced by the Middle East (the revolutions of Arab peoples and others) revealed that Turkey's (harmonious) diplomacy was only in harmony with its higher interests and not with countries that have legal, border or historical problems and others with Turkey.

Turkey is working by establishing its feet economically and politically strongly in Iraq, to enhance its trade relations and economic and investment partnerships with the Arab Gulf states to the level of strong strategic partnership.For her, Iraq is the vital gate through which it overlooks the Persian Gulf.

- Turkey's indulgence in the issues and affairs of the Middle East when developing multiple -field arrangements or to dictate conditions on a number of international units in the region. This comes in an effort to create an environment that suits and meets its higher interests, and its great goal remains is to join the European Union.Turkey is trying, through its effectiveness in the Middle East region, to be a prominent regional force with its political, economic, social and economic weight, to qualify it to join the European Union.Turkey has become a strong economy after its economic -commercial economic move towards Iraq in particular and towards the countries of the Middle East in general, is one of the factors that encourage Turkey as a member of the European Union, which has become suffering from severe economic crises, some of its members who represent economic weakness in the European UnionLike Greece, Cyprus and spain, due to the large number of financial loans from the Federation Fund or some of its members directly, such as Germany.

- Employing the ability to produce and export Iraq for oil in good quantities currently - and the production and export of natural gas in the future - through the Kirkuk line tubes - Cihan to European global markets, as well as employing the passage of oil and gas pipelines coming from the Caucasus countries to the East European countries (via Georgia) to increase their position inThe European Union is aware and to announce itself the vital window of Europe (in the field of energy and economics) and urge it to accept its accession to it.

- The security of the Middle East, reforming its affairs and addressing its issues as a whole requires the participation of all countries of the region, and each according to their ability to develop relations between its units and its security arrangements and move its economy.Dependence on major international powers or international organizations (the United Nations or the security Council) only in this matter is no longer useful, because the major and even regional international powers are all seeking to achieve their own interests, even on the interests of the rest of the international units.

Recommendations:

First: the Holy Quran

second: Dictionaries and dictionaries:

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  1. عبد الزهرة شلش زامل العتّابي، توجهات تركيا نحو أقطار الخليج العربي (دراسة في الجغرافية السياسية)، رسالة تقدم بها مجلس كلية التربية – جامعة البصرة وهي جزء من متطلبات نيل شهادة الماجستير في الجغرافية، تشرين الأول 1997.
  2. محمد مصطفى قادر الجشعمي، فاعلية القانون الدولي العام في إطار توازن القوى: مرحلة ما بعد الحرب الباردة، رسالة ماجستير مقدمة الى مجلس المعهد العالي للدراسات السياسية والدولية، جامعة المستنصرية، 2005.
  1. إبراهيم خليل العلاف و عبد الله فاضل الحيالي وواثق محمد براك السعدون وفارس تركي الجبوري، التقرير الإستراتيجي: 2009 – 2010، مركز الدراسات الإقليمية، جامعة الموصل، ط 1، دار إبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، 2011.
  2. إبراهيم خليل العلاف وآخرون، التقرير الإستراتيجي: 2011 – 2012، مركز الدراسات الإقليمية / جامعة الموصل، دار إبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، 2012.
  3. أحمد نوري النعيمي، القضية الكردية في تركيا: الواقع والمستقبل، مجلة دراسات دولية – سلسة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد / مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 48، بغداد، 2003.
  4. أحمد نوري النعيمي، موقف المؤسسة العسكرية من الحركة الإسلامية في تركيا، دراسات دولية، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، العدد 60، كلية العلوم السياسية – جامعة بغداد، بغداد، 2004.
  5. إدريس بووانو (باحث مغربي)، معادلات خفية في الصراع بين التيار الإسلامي والتيار العلماني في تركيا، المستقبل العربي: مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، العدد 299، 1 / 2004 .
  6. أعضاء من وزارة الخارجية التركية وأعضاء من هيئة التخطيط التركية، تركيا والعالم 2010 – 2020: ظهور طرف فاعل جديد على الساحة العالمية، شركة أي.أم جرافيك للطباعة، القاهرة – مصر، 1999.
  7. بان غانم أحمد الصائغ، انعكاسات العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية على العلاقات العربية – التركية، تحرير: نوفل قاسم علي الشهوان، من أعمال المؤتمر العلمي السنوي السادس لمركز الدراسات الإقليمية، جامعة الموصل للمدة 3 – 4 جمادى الآخر 1430ه الموافق ليومي 27 – 28 أيار 2009، دار أبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، موصل – العراق،
  8. تركيا المعاصرة، د. إبراهيم خليل أحمد و آخرون، مركز الدراسات التركية ( سابقاً ) مركز الدراسات الإقليمية ( حالياً ) – جامعة الموصل، مديرية دار الكتب للطباعة والنشر – جامعة الموصل، 1987.
  9. التقرير ( كراسة )، مركز دراسات الشرق الأوسط، العدد 13، عمان – الأردن، تشرين الأول 2000 .
  10. جلال عبد الله معوض، صناعة القرار في تركيا والعلاقات العربية – التركية، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، بيروت – لبنان، 1998.
  11. حسن بكر أحمد، العلاقات العربية – التركية بين الحاضر والمستقبل، مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الإستراتيجية، العدد 41، ط 1، أبو ظبي – الإمارات، 2000.
  12. حنا عزو بهنان، قضية حزب العمال الكردستاني وانعكاساتها على العلاقات العراقية – التركية، (1984– 2008).
  13. خليل إبراهيم الطيار، الصراع بين العلمانية والإسلام في تركيا، مركز الإمارات للدراسات والبحوث الإستراتيجية، ط 1، أبو ظبي – الإمارات 2004.
  14. رواء زكي يونس الطويل و وصال نجيب العزاوي، السياسة العامة في تركيا – الركيزة الاقتصادية–، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، مركز الدراسات الدولية / جامعة بغداد، العدد 30، بغداد – العراق، 2002.
  15. شؤون الأوسط، سيفي طاشهان (مؤسس الجمعية التركية – الأوربية ومؤسس دراسات الشرق أوسطية والبلقانية)، حاوره محمد نور الدين، جيوبوليتيكا تركيا– مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية، العدد 108، خريف 2002.
  16. طلال يونس الجليلي، تركيا والحلم الأوربي: ابتعاد أم إتحاد ؟! متابعات تركية، مركز الدراسات التركية ( مركز الدراسات الإقليمية حالياً ) / جامعة الموصل، السنة الأولى، المجلد الأول، الأعداد 1– 12، آذار 2002 – شباط 2003،
  17. عقيل سعيد محفوض، السياسة الخارجية التركية: الاستمرارية – التغيير، المركز العربي للأبحاث ودراسة السياسات، ط 1، حزيران / يونيو 2010، بيروت – لبنان .
  18. لينور مارتن، الأمن القومي التركي في الشرق الأوسط، ترجمة وتعليق: أ. د. خليل علي مراد جامعة الموصل: مركز الدراسات الإقليمية، سلسلة شؤون إقليمية رقم (3)، الموصل، ط 1، مطبعة دار أبن الأثير، 2005 .
  19. معتز محمد سلامة، الجيش والسياسة في تركيا، السياسة الدولية – الملف، العدد 131، السنة 34، القاهرة – مصر، 1998.
  20. الملف السياسي ( حلقة نقاشية )، العدد 10، جامعة بغداد – مركز الدراسات الدولية، بغداد، 2005.
  21. المؤتمر العلمي السنوي السادس لمركز الدراسات الإقليمية / جامعة الموصل للمدة 3 – 4 جمادى الآخر 1430 هـ الموافق ليومي 27 – 28 آيار 2009 م، تـحـريـــــــر: نوفل قاسم علي الشهوان، دار إبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، موصل – العراق، 2010.
  22. نزار عبد اللطيف إسماعيل، معضلات العلاقات التركية – الأوروبية، مجلة العلوم السياسية، السنة 11، العدد 30، كلية العلوم السياسية، جامعة بغداد، كانون الثاني 2005.
  23. وصال نجيب العزاوي و رواء زكي يونس الطويل، تركيا وإسرائيل (الدور المركب)، مركز الدراسات الدولية، جامعة بغداد، العدد 36، بغداد، 2002.
  24. وصال نجيب العزاوي، القضية الكردية في تركيا حتى عام 1993، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد – مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 80، بغداد، 2005.
  25. وصال نجيب العزاوي، المؤسسة العسكرية التركية: دراسة في الدور السياسي للمؤسسات العسكرية التركية (1960 – 1980)، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية – جامعة بغداد، العدد 81، بغداد، 2005.

sixth: Patrols, newspapers and magazines:

  1. جلال عبد الله معوض، مجلة المستقبل العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، السنة الواحدة والعشرين، العدد 237، التعاون العسكري التركي – الإسرائيلي، 11 / 1998.
  2. رجائي فايد، كراسات إستراتيجية، كردستان العراق أكثر من فيدرالية وأقل من إستقلال،مركز الدراسات السياسية والإستراتيجية، السنة الخامسة عشر، العدد 156، القاهرة – مصر، 2005، .
  3. ستار جبار الجابري، مجلة أوراق أوروبية، جامعة بغداد – كلية العلوم السياسية، السنة الرابعة، العدد 111، 2002، الأوضاع السياسية في تركيا الى أين؟.
  4. سلام الربضي، المجلة العربية للعلوم السياسية، العدد 30، التآكل في العلاقات التركية – الإسرائيلية وإستبعاد التغيّر الإستراتيجي، بيروت – لبنان، ربيع 2011.
  5. عبد الوهاب عبد الستار القصاب، مجلة أوراق عربية، تهديدات دول الجوار الإقليمي للأمنالقومي العربي: تركيا – دراسة حالة، العدد 28، آذار 2000، مركز دراسات وبحوث الوطن العربي – الجامعة المستنصرية، بغداد .
  6. مجلة الإدارة العامة – الإدارة والتدبير، الرياض – المملكة العربية السعودية، العدد 51، 1986.
  7. مجلة الحكمة، العدد 8، بغداد، 1999.
  8. مجلة الراصد الدولي، مركز الدراسات الدولية – جامعة بغداد، العدد 68، بغداد، السنة الثانية / أيلول 2002.
  9. مجلة السياسة الدولية، (الملف)، العدد 131، السنة 1998، القاهرة – مصر.
  10. مجلة العلوم السياسية، جامعة بغداد / كلية العلوم السياسية، العدد 15، بغداد، كانون الثاني/2002.
  11. مجلة العلوم السياسية، جامعة بغداد / كلية العلوم السياسية، العدد 29، تشرين الأول 2004، بغداد.
  12. مجلة المستقبل العربي، تصدر عن مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، العدد 277، 3 / 2002.
  13. مجلة المستقبل العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، العدد 299، 2004 .
  14. مجلة أم المعارك، تشرين الأول، بغداد، 1997.
  15. مجلة أوراق دولية، العدد 175، آذار 2009، مركز الدراسات الدولية / جامعة بغداد، بغداد – العراق.
  16. مجلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد- مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 5، 1998، وقائع المؤتمر العلمي السنوي الثاني 1997 – 1998.
  17. مجلة دراسات إقليمية، جامعة الموصل، العدد 7، السنة الرابعة، دار إبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، 2007.
  18. مجلة دراسات دولية، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد – مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 80، بغداد، 2005.
  19. مجلة دراسات دولية، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد – مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 90، بغداد، 2006.
  20. مجلة دراسات دولية، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد / مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 48، بغداد، 2003.
  21. مجلة دراسات دولية، سلسلة دراسات إستراتيجية، جامعة بغداد، العدد 81، بغداد، 2005.
  22. مجلة رؤية للبحوث والدراسات الإستراتيجية، العدد 2، بغداد – العراق، نيسان 2012.
  23. مجلة سلسلة إستراتيجيات، العدد، 3 – 4، مطبعة دار الجمهورية للصحافة، بغداد، 2005.
  24. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 123، بيروت – لبنان، صيف2006.
  25. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 118، بيروت – لبنان، ربيع 2005.
  26. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 116، بيروت – لبنان، خريف 2004.
  27. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 127، بيروت – لبنان، خريف 2007.
  28. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 143، خريف، بيروت – لبنان، 2012.
  29. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 108، بيروت – لبنان، خريف 2002.
  30. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 122، بيروت – لبنان ربيع، 2006.
  31. مجلة شؤون الأوسط، مركز الدراسات الإستراتيجية والبحوث والتوثيق، العدد 103، بيروت – لبنان، صيف 2001.
  32. مجلة كلية التدريب والتنمية، أكاديمية مبارك للأمن، مصر، العدد 3، تموز 2000.
  33. مجلة متابعات تركية، مركز الدراسات التركية – سابقاً – (مركز الدراسات الإقليمية حالياً)، جامعة الموصل، السنة الأولى، المجلد الأول، الأعداد 1 – 12، آذار 2002 – شباط 2003.
  34. محمد نور الدين، أوراق عربية، الدور التركي تجاه المحيط العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدةالعربية، شؤون سياسية (5)، ط1، بيروت – لبنان، كانون الثاني 2012.
  35. مصطفى عبد الكريم العدوان، مجلة الدراسات الدولية، أثر الشراكة الإستراتيجية بين تركيا و (إسرائيل) على الدول العربية المجاورة، جامعة بغداد – مركز الدراسات الدولية، العدد 15، بغداد، كانون الثاني، 2002.
  36. منعم صاحي العمار، نشرة، مركز الدراسات الدولية – جامعة بغداد، العدد 15، السياسة الخارجية التركية المعاصرة: نظرة في سر الدينامية المؤثرة، 1997.
  37. نبيل محمد سليم، مجلة قضايا سياسية، دور تركيا في الترتيبات الأمنية الأمريكية للشرق الأوسط، المجلد الأول، العدد 2، جامعة النهرين، بغداد، صيف 2003.
  38. نزار عبد اللطيف إسماعيل، مجلة العلوم السياسية، العدد 30، السنة 11، جامعة بغداد – كلية العلوم السياسية، معضلات العلاقات التركية – الأوربية، كانون الثاني 2005.
  39. نوال عبد الجبار سلطان الطائي، مجلة دراسات إقليمية، المتغيرات السياسية التركية تجاه المشكلة الكردية 1999 – 2006، العدد 7، السنة الرابعة، دار إبن الأثير للطباعة والنشر، 2007.
  40. نوال عبد الجبار سلطان، أزمات سياسية أم أزمة هوية، متابعات إقليمية / مركز الدراسات الإقليمية – جامعة الموصل، العدد 7، حزيران 2004.
  41. هيثم الكيلاني، مجلة المستقبل العربي، مركز دراسات الوحدة العربية، العدد 244، 6 / 1999، بيروت – لبنان، العلاقات العربية – التركية وآفاقها المستقبلية.
  1. libya-alyoum.com/news
  2. wikipedia.org/wiki
  3. Enotes.com̸ effectiveness-efficiency-reference
  4. http://ar.wikipedia.org/wiki/
  5. vb.maharty.com
  6. http://www.10000maps.com/app/10000maps.html?map=600-4#.UVdshIww44c.
  7. http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/VeriBilgi.do?alt_id=12
  8. http://www.economy.gov.tr/index.cfm?sayfa=countriesandregions&country=IQ&region=4

Refernce

  1. Dictionary of sociology, Fairchild، P، New York، free press، 1976، P 56.
  2. Merriam – Webster’s, 2008, U. s. A. .
  3. Oxford advanced learner’s Dictionary.
  4. The Oxford Mini dictionary، Coyce M. Hawkins، Printed in Great Britain at the University Printing House، Oxford، 1986.

Books

  1. social foundations of thought and action. A social cognitive theory، Bandura‚ A. (1986). New Cersey. Prentice Hall
  2. self – efficiency. The exercise of control, Bandura ‚ A. ( 1997 ). New York. W. H. Freeman and company.
  3. scientific social survey and research, Young, P.V., New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939 .
  4. Hand book of Budgeting, H. w. Allen sweey and Robert Rahchlin, Cohn Wiley & sons, INC, UsA, 1981.
  5. Managing Information in the E – Business Enterprise Technology, Cames A. Obrien Fifth Edition, McGraw Hill, Boston, UsA.

Information for strategic Decision, ROD FORD K.C., Reston publicing company Inc (U.s.A), 197

Source: Master Thesis entitled Effectiveness in the Turkish Strategic Orientation towards the Middle East region after 2002 “Iraq as a model”, prepared by the student Adnan Rahman Ibrahim

5/5 - (2 صوتين)(Read more)الحكومة الإسرائيلية القادمة ستكون حكومة الضم والتصعيد العسكري الوسومالشرق الأوسط تركيا