By: Michael Kimik, Lena Fex
Translation: Sardar Herky
When Russia joined the ongoing civil war in Syria, in the summer of 2015, it shocked the United States and its partners. Out of frustration, President Barack Obama claimed that Syria would become a "quagmire" for Russia and Russian President Vladimir Putin. Syria could be Russia's Vietnam or Putin's Afghanistan, a grave mistake that will eventually backfire against Russian interests.
Syria did not end up being a quagmire for Putin. Russia changed the course of the war, saving Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from imminent defeat, then translating military might into diplomatic leverage. It kept costs and injuries sustainable. Now Russia cannot be ignored in Syria. There was no diplomatic settlement. Instead, Moscow has accumulated greater regional influence, from Israel to Libya, and retained a loyal partner for Assad to project Russia's power. In Syria, what the Obama administration failed to anticipate was the possibility of Russian intervention succeeding.
In the surreal winter of 2021-2022, the United States and Europe are once again contemplating a major Russian military intervention, this time in Europe itself. Again, many analysts warn of dire consequences for the abuser. On 11 February, British Secretary of State for Europe James Cleverly predicted that a wider war in Ukraine "would be a quagmire" for Russia. In a rational cost-benefit analysis, the thinking goes that the price of an all-out war in Ukraine would be too high for the Kremlin and entail great bloodshed. The United States estimated up to 50,000 civilian casualties. Besides undermining Putin's support among the Russian elite, who would personally suffer from subsequent tensions with Europe, war could jeopardize Russia's economy and alienate the public. At the same time, it could bring NATO forces closer to Russia's borders, leaving Russia to fight Ukrainian resistance for years to come. According to this view, Russia will be trapped in a disaster of its own making.
However, Putin's cost-benefit analysis seems to favor a change in the European status quo. Russia's leadership is taking more risks, and on top of the daily political struggle, Putin is on a historic mission to consolidate Russia's influence in Ukraine (as he has done recently in Belarus and Kazakhstan). As Moscow can see, victory in Ukraine may be within reach. Of course, Russia may simply prolong the current crisis without invading or finding a palatable way to disengage. But if the Kremlin's calculations are correct, as they were ultimately in Syria, the United States and Europe must also be prepared for another possibility than the quagmire. What if Russia won in Ukraine?
If Russia can control Ukraine or destabilize it on a large scale, a new era will begin for the United States and Europe. US and European leaders will face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides will have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities - vigorously defending European peace and avoiding military escalation with Russia - will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies may find themselves completely unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia's military actions in Ukraine.
Many ways to win
For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take many different forms. As in Syria, victory does not have to lead to a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kiev or the division of the country. Alternatively, defeating the Ukrainian army and negotiating Ukraine's surrender could effectively turn Ukraine into a failed state. Russia can also use destructive cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple the country and spur regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have effectively broken away from the West.
If Russia achieves its political goals in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be the same as it was before the war. Not only will the supremacy of the United States in Europe be qualified; Any sense that the European Union or NATO could guarantee peace on the continent would be an artifact of a lost era. Instead, security in Europe should be confined to the defense of core members of the European Union and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to terminate an extension or association policy; But it will be a fait accompli. Under the perceived blockade by Russia, the EU and NATO will not have the capacity for ambitious policies outside their borders.
The United States and Europe will also be in a permanent economic war with Russia. The West will seek sweeping sanctions, which Russia is likely to avoid with cyber measures and energy extortion, given economic disparities. China may side with Russia in this economic move. Meanwhile, domestic politics in European countries will resemble the Great Game of the 21st Century, as Russia will scrutinize Europe for any breakdown in commitment to NATO and the transatlantic relationship. Through fair and foul methods, Russia will seize any opportunity that comes its way to influence public opinion and elections in European countries. Russia will be a chaotic presence—sometimes real, sometimes imagined—in every instance of European political instability.
Cold War comparisons are not helpful in a world dominated by Russian Ukraine. Cold War borders in Europe had bright spots, but they were settled in a mutually acceptable way in the final Helsinki Act of 1975. By contrast, Russian sovereignty over Ukraine would open up a vast area of instability and insecurity from Estonia to Poland to Romania to Turkey. As long as it continues, Russia's presence in Ukraine will be seen by Ukraine's neighbors as provocative, unacceptable, and, for some, a threat to their security. Amidst this changing dynamic, order in Europe must be conceived primarily from a military perspective - which would be in the interest of the Kremlin, given that Russia has a stronger hand in the military field than in the economic field - which would be in the interest of the Kremlin to marginalize non-military institutions such as the European Union.
Russia has the largest conventional army in Europe, which is more than ready for use. The EU's defense policy, unlike that of NATO, is far from being able to provide security for its members. Thus, military reassurance, especially from the eastern EU states, will be key. Responding to a retaliatory Russia with sanctions and a rhetorical declaration of a rules-based international order will not be enough.
Invading Eastern Europe
If Russia wins in Ukraine, Germany's position in Europe will face severe challenges. Germany is a marginal military power that bases its post-war political identity on a rejection of war. The circle of friends that surrounded it, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risked being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will take leading roles in European affairs thanks to their relatively strong militaries and long traditions of military intervention. However, the main factor in Europe will still be the United States. NATO will depend on the support of the United States as well as on the restive and vulnerable states of Eastern Europe, frontline states scattered along a very large, expansive, and uncertain line of communication with Russia, including Belarus and Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.
Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania, are likely to have large numbers of NATO forces stationed permanently on their soil. It would be impossible to refuse a request by Finland and Sweden for an Article 5 obligation to join NATO. In Ukraine the EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russia-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they face with Belarus: imposing sanctions without punishing the population and subsidizing those in need without reaching them. Some NATO members will promote the Ukrainian insurrection, and Russia will respond to it by threatening NATO members.
Ukraine's predicament would be too great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, perhaps in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian army that were not directly defeated would continue to fight, echoing the partisan warfare that tore this entire region of Europe during and after World War II.
The permanent state of escalation between Russia and Europe may remain cold from a military perspective. However, it is likely to be economically hot. The sanctions imposed on Russia in 2014, which were linked to official diplomacy (often referred to as the "Minsk" process, after the city where the negotiations were held), were not draconian. It was conditional and reversible. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, new sanctions on banking and technology transfer will be significant and permanent. They will come on the heels of failed diplomacy and begin the “peace summit,” according to the administration. In response, Russia will retaliate, most likely in the cyber domain as well as in the energy sector. Moscow would limit access to vital commodities such as titanium, of which Russia was the world's second largest exporter. This war of attrition will test both sides. Russia will be ruthless in its attempt to persuade one or several European countries to back down from the economic conflict by linking the easing of tensions to the self-interests of these countries, thus undermining the consensus in the EU and NATO.
Europe's strong suit is its economic clout. Russia's assets will be a source of division or domestic turmoil in Europe or Europe's transatlantic partners. Here Russia will be proactive and opportunistic. If a pro-Russian movement or candidate emerges, that candidate can be encouraged directly or indirectly. If an economic or political tipping point reduces the effectiveness of the foreign policy of the United States and its allies, it will be a weapon for Russian propaganda efforts and Russian espionage.
A lot of this is already happening. But the war in Ukraine will come to an end. Russia will use more resources and will not be restricted in choosing tools. The massive flows of refugees reaching Europe will exacerbate the EU's unresolved refugee policy and provide fertile ground for populists. The holy grail of these media, political and cyber battles will be the 2024 presidential election in the United States. The future of Europe will depend on this election. The election of Donald Trump or a Trumpian candidate could destroy the transatlantic relationship at the hour of maximum danger in Europe, calling into question NATO's position and its security guarantees for Europe.
Turning NATO Inward
For the United States, Russia's victory will have profound implications for its grand strategy in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. First, Russian success in Ukraine will require Washington to focus on Europe. No ambiguity about NATO's Article 5 (of the kind experienced under Trump) will be allowed. Only a strong US commitment to Europe's security will prevent Russia from dividing European nations from one another. This will be difficult given the competing priorities, particularly those facing the United States in a deteriorating relationship with China. But the interests at stake are fundamental. The United States has a very large trading stake in Europe. The European Union and the United States are each other's largest trading and investment partner, with trade in goods and services totaling $1.1 trillion in 2019. A peaceful and well-functioning Europe promotes American foreign policy—on climate change, nonproliferation, global public health, and global public health management. Tensions with China or Russia. If Europe is destabilized, the United States will be the most unified in the world.
NATO is the logical means by which the United States can provide security reassurance to Europe and deter Russia. The war in Ukraine would revive NATO not as a democracy-building project or as a tool for missions outside the region like the war in Afghanistan but as the unparalleled defensive military alliance it was designed to be. Although the Europeans would demand a greater military commitment from the United States to Europe, a broader Russian invasion of Ukraine should prompt each NATO member to increase its defense spending. For the Europeans, this will be the final call to improve Europe's defense capabilities — along with the United States' — in order to help the United States manage the Russia-China dilemma.
Moscow is in constant confrontation with the West, and Beijing can serve as an economic pillar and partner in opposition to American hegemony. In the worst case for US grand strategy, China might be emboldened by Russia's persistence and threaten confrontation over Taiwan. But there is no guarantee that the escalation in Ukraine will benefit Sino-Russian relations. China's ambition to become the central node of the Eurasian economy will be damaged by the war in Europe, because of the monstrous uncertainty that war brings. Chinese anger at Russia at the rally will not enable a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, but it could start new talks.
The shock caused by a major military move by Russia will raise questions in Ankara as well. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been enjoying the venerable Cold War game of manipulating the great powers. However, Türkiye has a strong relationship with Ukraine. As a member of NATO, you will not benefit from the militarization of the Black Sea and the eastern Mediterranean. Russian actions that destabilize the broader region could push Turkey back toward the United States, which in turn could drive a wedge between Ankara and Moscow. This will be beneficial for NATO, and it will also open up greater possibilities for the US-Turkish partnership in the Middle East. Instead of being a nuisance, Turkey could turn into the kind of ally it is meant to be.
The bitter consequence of a broader war in Ukraine is that Russia and the United States will now face each other as enemies in Europe. However, they would be enemies who could not tolerate hostilities beyond a certain threshold. No matter their worldviews, however ideologically opposed they may be, the world's two most important nuclear powers will have to control their anger. This would be a fantastically deceptive act of juggling: a state of economic warfare and geopolitical conflict across the European continent, yet one that does not permit escalation into outright war. At the same time, the US-Russian confrontation could at worst extend to proxy wars in the Middle East or Africa if the US decides to re-establish its presence after the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Maintaining communication, especially with regards to strategic stability and cyber security, will be critical. It is worth noting that US-Russian cooperation on malicious cyber activities continues even during the current tensions. The need to maintain strict arms control agreements will be even greater after the Ukraine war and its sanctions regime.
There is no permanent victory
As the crisis in Ukraine develops, the West should not underestimate Russia. You should not rely on wishful thinking. Russia's victory in Ukraine is not science fiction.
But if there is little the West can do to prevent a Russian military invasion, it will be able to influence what happens next. Often the seeds of trouble lie beneath the veneer of military victory. Russia can eviscerate Ukraine on the battlefield. It can make Ukraine a failed state. But she can do this only by waging a criminal war and destroying the life of a nation-state that never conquered Russia. The United States, Europe, their allies and other parts of the world will draw conclusions and criticize Russia's actions. Through their alliances and their support for the people of Ukraine, the United States and Europe can embody the alternative to wars of aggression and the spirit of might that makes right. Russian efforts to sow chaos can be compared to Western efforts to restore order.
Inasmuch as the United States kept the three Baltic states' diplomatic properties in Washington, D.C., after they were annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II, the West can position itself on the side of decency and dignity in this conflict. Wars won are not won forever. Too often countries defeat themselves over time by waging and then winning the wrong wars.
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